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STATEMENT OF DISCLAIMER
This project report is a result of a class assignment; it has been graded and accepted as fulfillment of the
course requirements. Acceptance of this report in fulfillment of the course requirements does not imply
technical accuracy or reliability. Any use of information in this report is done at the risk of the user. These
risks may include, but may not be limited to, catastrophic failure of the device or infringement of patent
or copyright laws. California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo and its staff cannot be held
liable for any use or misuse of the project.
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ABSTRACT
This report contains a prescriptive design analysis and a performance based design analysis for a newly
constructed United States Air Force 3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar and support spaces.
The prescriptive design analysis reviews the code requirements for fire suppression, fire alarm, life safety,
and structural fire protection. Additionally, the hydraulic demands of the fire suppression system, and the
voltage drop and power supply requirements of the fire alarm systems were calculated. The results of the
analysis portray a compliant prescriptive design of the fire protection systems.
The performance based design analysis evaluates the hazards in the 3-bay facility for two objectives; Life
safety and aircraft protection. The life safety objective has been evaluated through an analysis of the
available safe egress time (ASET) versus the required safe egress time (RSET). The ASET tenability
limits for this analysis were defined as when the smoke layer would descend to 6 ft above finished floor.
For this scenario, RSET was determined to be 63% less than ASET.
The aircraft protection objective was evaluated by modeling the effects of the design fire on the aircraft
against the known critical heat fluxes of the aircraft coatings. Results from this analysis conclude that the
performance criteria of the fire suppression systems fail to adequately protect the aircraft from the effects
of prolonged exposure to incidental radiant heat fluxes for conservative underwing fires.
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1.0

3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar

INTRODUCTION

This report includes a prescriptive design analysis and a performance based design analysis for a recently
constructed 3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar and support spaces. The prescriptive design
analysis observes the code requirements for fire suppression, fire alarm, life safety, and structural fire
analysis. The performance based design analysis evaluates the hazards in the 3-bay facility for two
objectives; Life safety and aircraft protection. The life safety objective has been evaluated through an
analysis of the available safe egress time (ASET) versus the required safe egress time (RSET). The
aircraft protection objective is evaluated by comparing the effects of an assumed fire scenario on the
aircraft against the critical heat flux of the aircraft coatings.

1.1

Building Description

This 3-Bay general maintenance hangar is approximately 159,100 Sq. Ft. where each hangar bay is
approximately 47,500 Sq. Ft. The hangar bays are protected with an overhead wet-pipe automatic
sprinkler system and supplementary high expansion foam/water deluge systems. The foam/water systems
for each hangar bay are released individually by a single dedicated releasing panel from either manual
foam releasing stations or the simultaneous signal from two optical flame detectors. Foam stop/abort
stations are also provided to halt the flow of foam solution in the event of an inadvertent activation.
In addition to the three hangar bays, two separate support spaces are provided adjacent to the North side
of the hangars. Attached support spaces are protected with wet-pipe automatic sprinkler systems.
A combined fire alarm and mass notification system is provided throughout the entire facility.
Fire water is provided from two 66,000 gallon above ground dedicated fire water storage tanks located
just northeast of the facility. Fire water from the storage tanks are fed underground into Fire Protection
Room 401 where the supply is boosted by two electric fire pumps each rated from 2,500 gpm at 210 psi.
Additional fire water supply is fed from Room 401 to Room 504 to support additional fire suppression
risers.

1.2

Purpose

The purpose of this facility is to support the upcoming mission of the KC-46 Pegasus program. The KC46 Pegasus is the first phase of a 3-phase effort to replace the U.S. Air Force's aging tanker fleet. With
more refueling capacity and enhanced capabilities, improved efficiency and increased capabilities for
cargo and aeromedical evacuation, the KC-46 provides aerial refueling support to the Air Force, Navy,
Marine Corps as well as allied nation coalition force aircraft.
FPE-596
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In addition to the design of the aircraft, many major infrastructure upgrades and additions were required
to accommodate and maintain these new assets. This facility will be able to accommodate the
simultaneous maintenance procedures for three KC-46 aircraft. Maintenance procedures are primarily
preventative, rather than corrective, which ensures the equipment is ready and available at the time of
need.
Maintenance procedures are classified by AFI 21-101 - Aerospace Equipment Maintenance Management,
as on-equipment maintenance or off-equipment maintenance. On-equipment work is prepared on the
aircraft in the hangar bay, while off-equipment maintenance is performed in a repair shop on components
that are removed during on maintenance procedures. The hangar bays in this facility are capable of
preparing general on-equipment work and the hydraulic shop and general shops in the support area are
capable of accommodating general off-equipment maintenance.
Figure 1-1 below shows a KC-46 performing refueling operations through the rear boom for an F-16
fighter.

Figure 1-1: Image of KC-46 Pegasus Performing In-Air Refueling Operations
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Applicable Codes and Standards

UFC 1-200-01 requires the use of several codes and standards, primarily the International Building Code
(IBC), NFPA 101 Life Safety Code, and UFC 3-600-01 Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities. In
accordance with UFC 1-200-01, the IBC’s focus is on allowable floor area, building height limitations,
and building separation distance requirements. NFPA 101 is used for building construction related to
egress and life safety.
In addition to the codes listed above, ETL 02-15 contains specific requirements regarding the fire
suppression and fire alarm systems in hangars and the support areas. The following codes and standards
have been used in this analysis
International Code Council (ICC)
IBC

International Building Code, 2012 Edition

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
NFPA 10
NFPA 11
NFPA 13
NFPA 20
NFPA 22
NFPA 24
2013 Edition
NFPA 70
NFPA 72
NFPA 80
NFPA 90A
NFPA 101

Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, 2013 Edition
Standard for Low, Medium, and High Expansion Foam Systems, 2010 Edition
Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2013 Edition
Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection, 2013 Edition
Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection, 2013 Edition
Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances,
National Electrical Code, 2011 Edition
National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 2013 Edition
Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives, 2013 Edition
Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, 2012 Edition
Life Safety Code, 2012 Edition

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
UFC 1-200-01
UFC 3-600-01
UFC 4-010-01
UFC 4-021-01
UFC 4-211-01

General Building Requirements, July 2013 Edition
Design: Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities, Change 3, 2013 Edition
DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, 2012 Edition
Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems, 2010 Edition
DRAFT Aircraft Maintenance Hangars, 95% Draft Pre-Release

U.S. Air Force (USAF)
ETL 02-15

FPE-596
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Hierarchy of Codes and Standards

Due to the numerous codes and standards that are applicable to this building analysis, the following figure
has been created to serve as a visual guide. The codes shown in orange are to be treated as supplemental
or amendments to codes shown in red. Additionally, NFPA 101 is intended to supplement means of
egress requirements where specified in the UFC 3-600-01. A visual guide of the code hierarchy is
presented in Figure 1-2.

Figure 1-2: Hierarchical Flow Chart of Codes and Standards

For example, UFC 1-200-01 specifies the use of UFC 3-600-01 for determining the requirements for fire
protection systems. However, ETL 02-15 and the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 document are to be used in lieu
of the UFC 3-600-01 unless otherwise stated.
The codes and standards listed above will be used in the proceeding section. A complete building code
analysis in accordance with UFC 1-200-01, UFC-3-600-01, and IBC 2012 has been provided in Section
2.0.

FPE-596
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BUILDING CODE ANALYSIS

The hangar building footprint is approximately 232 ft x 630 ft, with two 62 ft x ~150 ft wide shop/office
adjoining single story areas. The structure consists of a 3-bay hangar area with adjoining single story
structures for squadron operations areas, shops and administration areas. This structure is a custom
designed steel frame building.

2.1

Classification of Occupancy

Per the UFC 1-200-01, the use and occupancy classifications are to be determined in accordance with
UFC 3-600-01 and Chapter 3 of the 2012 IBC. The building is a non-separated mixed use S-1 occupancy
with accessory B/F-1 occupancies per IBC Section 508.2. Table 2-1 below shows the occupancy
classifications per the IBC as well as NFPA 101. A summary of the occupancy classifications per IBC
and NFPA 101 is included in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1: Classification of Occupancies
Occupancy

IBC

NFPA 101

Aircraft Hangar Bays

Storage Group S-1
Section 311.2

Industrial – General
Section 6.1.12, 40.1.1.1.1

Business Group B
Section 304.1

Business
Section 6.1.11

Factory Group F-1
Section 306.2

Industrial – General
Section 6.1.12, 40.1.1.1.1

Storage Group S-1
Section 311.2

Storage – Ordinary
Section 6.1.13, 6.2.2.3

Offices
Computer Room
Break Room (< 750 SF)
Showers/Lockers
Shop
Mechanical Areas
Tool Crib
Storage Rooms
Haz Mat

Because the primary function and use of this space is active aircraft maintenance procedures, the hangar
bays have been classified as a primary Group S-1 Occupancy. Because the combined Group B and Group
F-1 occupancies make up less than 10% of the overall area of the structure, they are considered as
accessory to the main occupancy.
Visual representations of the IBC occupancy classifications are included in Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2, and
Figure 2-3.

FPE-596
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This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 2-1: Classification of Occupancies - Entire Facility

This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 2-2: Classification of Occupancies - North Support Areas
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This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 2-3: Classification of Occupancies - South Support Areas

2.2

Structural Fire Protection

UFC 3-600-01 Section 2.1.3 requires the use of the IBC for determining the permitted types of
construction. However, per ETL 02-15 Section A1.1.1, at a minimum, a category Type I or Type II
Construction shall be utilized. The building construction is Type II-B per the IBC. Table 2-2 below shows
the rating requirements for various features of an IBC Type II-B building and the actual rating provided.
A summary of the type of construction required per IBC is included in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2: Type of Construction
Building Element

IBC Type II-B

Structural Frame
0 hour
Bearing Exterior Wall
0 hour
Bearing Interior Wall
0 hour
Non-Bearing Walls Exterior
Refer to Building Separation
Non-Bearing Walls Interior
0 hour*
Floor Construction Including
0 hour*
Supporting Beams and Joists
Roof Construction Including
0 hour
Supporting Beams and Joists
* Except as required for passive fire protection requirements.

FPE-596
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The hangar structure is framed with conventional rolled steel shapes for beams, columns and trusses.
Because the IBC does not require fire resistance ratings for Type II-B Construction, special protection of
members has not been provided.
The structure is supported on spread footings, strip footings and a floor slab at grade. All interior building
columns are supported on individual or continuous spread footings. Exterior building columns are
supported on spread footings (individual or continuous) connected with a perimeter grade beam. The slab
at grade is a “floating” concrete slab on grade. Slabs supporting aircraft will be designed in accordance
with airfield pavement methods to accommodate the loading associated with the aircraft.
The roof has been framed with a metal roof deck over steel open web joists spaced at 2.5 ft to 5.0 ft on
centers to support a standing seam metal roof. The joists span approximately 25 ft maximum to the
trusses or roof support members.
The exterior wall assembly is constructed of a layer of face brick, separating air space, rigid insulation,
and a bituminous damp proofing applied to 8” CMU up to 12’-0” above finish floor, and prefinished
insulated metal panels on horizontal girt are provided above masonry. Interior non-load bearing walls are
constructed of CMU and in some areas include pre-finished metal panels.
Overall, the structural design of this facility complies with the requirements of the IBC for a Type II-B
construction.

2.3

Building Separation

UFC 3-600-01 section 2-1.4 requires the IBC for determining the separation distances between buildings.
In accordance with IBC Table 602, a fire rating is not required where exterior bearing walls, non-bearing
walls, and unprotected openings are separated by more than 30 feet from other facilities.
Per ETL 02-15 section A1.1.1.4.2, the minimum separation between an aircraft hangar and other
buildings is 40 feet. The 3-bay maintenance hangar facility has no other facility within 40 feet and,
therefore, the walls or openings are not required to be protected.

2.4

Area Limitations

Per UFC 3-600-01 Section 2-1, the allowable area of the building shall be in accordance with the IBC. Per
ETL 02-15 Section 6, the ETL shall take precedence over UFC 3-600-01. Per ETL 02-15 Section
A1.1.1.3.1, the allowable floor area of a facility is unlimited when all of the following conditions are met.
This facility meets these requirements:
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The facility is fully sprinklered in accordance with ETL 02-15



The water supply to the sprinkler system is in compliance with ETL 02-15



The building separation from adjacent structures complies with ETL 02-15 Sections A1.1.4
though A1.1.4.3.



The internal separation walls comply with ETL 02-15 Section A1.1.1.2.

Because each of these conditions are met, the facility is considered an unlimited area building in
accordance with ETL 02-15 and IBC Chapter 5.

2.5

Height Limitations

Per UFC 3-600-01 section 2-1, the allowable height of the building shall be in accordance with the IBC.
For the highest roof surface, the peak is 98 feet and the eave is 50 feet. By the definition of building
height in IBC Section 502.1, the building is 74 feet tall. In accordance with IBC section 504.2, Type II-B,
Sprinklered construction is limited to 75 feet. The three bay maintenance hangar facility is within the
height limitation of the IBC. Figure 2-4 shows the south elevation of the hangar bay and the south support
area.

This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 2-4: South Elevation of the South Support Area

2.6

Occupancy Separation and Passive Fire Protection

Per ETL 02-15 Section A1.1.1.2.1, all operations outside of the aircraft surfacing area shall be isolated
from the aircraft servicing area by a masonry wall having a fire resistance rating of one hour. All
openings in this wall shall be automatic closing or self-closing and shall be automatic closing or selfclosing and shall be rated for at least 45 minutes.
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Per UFC 3-600-01 section 2-1.2, occupancy separation shall be in accordance with IBC Table 508.4. The
occupancies which exist in the facility are S-1, F-1, and B. Per the IBC, separation is not required
between these occupancies.
In accordance with the Air Force Chief Fire Protection Engineer, each bay is considered as a separate fire
suppression zone and a 3-hour non-masonry barrier is required and provided. Figure 2-5 shows the fire
rated barriers included in the 3-bay facility.

This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 2-5: Occupancy Separation and Passive Fire Protection

2.7

Additional Fire Separation Requirements

The fire separation requirements for many of the incidental use areas shown in the table below are
reduced from 1 hour to 0 hour based on the installation of a fully automatic sprinkler system in the
building. Additional fire rated separation requirements are presented in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3: Additional Fire Separation Requirements
AREA

BUILDING AREAS

NFPA SOURCE

SEPERATIONS

Corridors

All Corridors

0 hour

Hazardous
Areas

Mechanical Rooms,
General Storage

Fire Pump

Pump/Foam Room

0 hour per NFPA 101
Section 40.3.6
0 hour per NFPA 101
Section 40.3.2.4
1 hour per NFPA 20
Table 4.12.1.1.2
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Passive Fire Protection

Fire Rated Doors – Door openings are protected per NFPA 80. Doors, frames, and finish hardware are fire
rated based on the adjacent wall rating and NFPA 101 Table 8.3.4.2
Fire dampers are rated for at least 45 minutes are provided for all openings (i.e. duct penetrations and air
transfer openings) in the 1- hour fire rated barrier separating the aircraft servicing area from the support
areas in accordance with ETL 02-15 section A1.1.1.2.1.
Fire dampers are not provided in penetrations though the 1 hour rated barriers of the Pump/Foam Room
or the Haz Mat Room. Per NFPA 90A section 5.3.1.1, fire dampers are not required in ducts in walls that
have a fire resistance rating less than 2 hours. Fire dampers are provided in all air transfer openings
through partitions required to have a fire resistance rating in accordance with NFPA 90A section 5.3.1.2.

2.9

Building Code Summary

The preceding analysis highlighted the requirements per the building code for type of construction,
allowable height and area, passive fire protection, and smoke management systems. The following section
addresses the life safety components which depend largely on the selected classifications of the building
code analysis.
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LIFE SAFETY ANALYSIS

Occupant Load

Per the UFC 3-600-01, the means of egress is to comply with NFPA 101. Occupant Load is calculated in
accordance with NFPA 101 Table 7.3.1.2 utilizing the occupant load factor for each usage of space. For
the purposes of occupant loading, the usage of the space can be different than the occupancy
classification. For example, classrooms in a Business occupancy are not classified as an Educational or
Assembly occupancy, although the use from Table 7.3.1.2 most closely resembles an Education
classroom.
Table 3-1 includes the relevant occupant load factors per NFPA 101 Table 7.3.1.2.
Table 3-1: Occupant Load Factors
Area Type/Use (NFPA 101)

Occupant Load Factor

Industrial Use
Business Use
Assembly Less Concentrated (Without Fixed Seating)
Storage Use

100 SF/Person
100 SF/Person
15 SF/Person
500 SF/Person

If the use of any space is to change in the future, a new analysis of the building egress is required. The
building occupant load for the current configuration is shown in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2: Building Occupant Load
Level

Floor
Area
(SF)

Areas

Hangar Bays,
Shops
Offices
Main
Level

Break Room
Storage Rooms,
Haz Mat, Tool
Crib

Total

FPE-596

Occ.
Load
Factor

Persons

Storage

500

308

Business
Assembly
(less conc.)

100

30

15

25

Storage

500

4

Use Type

158,893

Area
(SF)

Total

367

367
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Arrangement of Exits

The arrangement of exits within the building have been located in accordance with NFPA 101 Section
7.5.1.3.3. Since the building is protected throughout by an approved, supervised, automatic sprinkler
system in accordance with Section 9.1, the minimum separation distance between exits or exit access
doors shall not be less than one-third the length of the maximum overall diagonal dimension of the
building or area to be served.
Per NFPA 101 Section 7.5.2.1, access to an exit shall not be through kitchens, storerooms, restrooms, or
workrooms. Additionally, access to the exit shall not be though a room subject to being locked. Per NFPA
101 Section 7.5.1.6, exit access shall not be through a room of higher hazard.
Per NFPA 101 Section 40.6.1.2, exits in hangars are provided not exceeding 150ft along the exterior
walls. Dwarf or smash doors are permitted in the aircraft accommodating doors in lieu of exit doors
complying with the normal code requirements of exit doors per NFPA 101 Section 40.6.1.4.
The exits provided in the support areas are in compliance with the requirements listed. The exits provided
in the hangar bay are also in compliance with the requirements of NFPA 101 Section 40.6.1.4.

3.3

Number of Exits

Per NFPA 101 section 7.4.1.1, the number of means of egress from a story shall not be less than two. In
accordance with NFPA 101 Section 7.4.1.2, where the occupant load is more than 1,000, not less than 4
exits from the building are required.
Per NFPA 101 Section 40.2.4.1.2, a single means of egress shall be permitted from any story or section in
a low or ordinary hazard industrial occupancies, provided that the exit can be reached within the distance
permitted as a common path of travel. This requirement applies to many or the smaller occupied rooms in
the support spaces.

3.4

Common Path, Dead-End, and Travel Distance Limit

The common path of travel, dead end corridors, and maximum travel distance are shown below for
sprinklered facilities in accordance with Table A.7.6 of NFPA 101.
Table 3-3: Common Path, Dead End, and Travel Distances
Type of Use

Common Path Limit

Dead End Limit

Travel Distance Limit

Industrial
General

100 ft

50 ft

250 ft
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Each hangar bay is in compliance with the requirements of NFPA 101. In all areas of the hangar bays, the
common path of travel is 0 ft because at any point, occupants have the choice between at least 2 paths of
travel. Additionally, within the hangar bays, an exit is well within the 250 ft. travel distance limitation.
No dead end corridors are present in the hangar bays.
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 below demonstrate the compliance of the support spaces with Table A.7.6 of
NFPA 101. Overall, the greatest common path distance in either of the support spaces is 30 ft. This is
within the acceptable limit defined by NFPA 101 and is compliant.

This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 3-1: Common Path and Travel Distances - North Support Areas
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This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 3-2: Common Path and Travel Distances - South Support Areas

3.5

Minimum Exit Widths

The egress capacity has been designed in accordance with NFPA 101 Sections 7.2 and 7.3. Table 3-4
below includes the egress capacity factors by component as specified by NFPA 101.
Table 3-4: Egress Capacity Factors by Component
Component

Requirement

NFPA 101

Doors in Exit Path
Corridor
Level Components

Minimum 32 Inch Clear
Minimum 36 Inch Clear
0.2 Inches per Person

Section 7.2.1.2.3.2
Section 7.3.4.1
Section 7.3.3.1

All doorways in the means of egress meet the requirements of NFPA 101 Section 7.2 and all exit
corridors meet the requirements of NFPA 101 Section 7.3.
Per the occupant load calculations determined in Section 3.1, the required egress width was determined.
The provided egress width exceeds the required egress width in accordance with NFPA 101. The
comparison is shown below in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5: Egress Capacity Validation
Level

Area

Requirement

Occupant Load

Required Width

Provided Width

Main Level

All

0.2 inches per person

367 persons

74 inches

1,258 inches
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OTHER LIFE SAFETY SPECIALTIES

Smoke Management

Smoke management in this facility is passive. Per NFPA 101, smoke/heat vents, smoke control systems,
or smoke barriers are not required for Industrial, Storage, and Business occupancies in an aircraft hangar.
To mitigate the propagation of smoke, upon any general fire alarm within the facility, the fire alarm
control panel de-energizes the air handling equipment.
Ceiling spaces are all un-sprinklered noncombustible areas, and therefore, do not require draft stops.
Some office partitions extend up to the structure above, which devices the ceiling spaces into smaller
areas, thereby providing some inherent smoke compartmentalization.
Draft curtains are provided in the Hangar Bays in accordance with ETL 02-15 Section A1.1.1.5. Draft
curtains shall be divided into spaces not exceeding 15,000 SF. The depth of the draft curtains shall be a
minimum of 1/8th the height of the hangar bay or the bottom of the lowest structural member, whichever
is lower. For the hangar bays in this facility, the draft curtains extend to a depth of 12 ft. from the hangar
bay ceiling.

This figure is not releasable in accordance
with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or
commercial or financial information that a
DOD component receives from a person or
organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record
will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary
handling of such records.

Figure 4-1: Passive Smoke Control - Location of Draft Curtains
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The draft curtains provided in this hangar are intended to expedite sprinkler activation times where
possibly hindered by the effects of the high ceiling. Traditionally, draft curtains were included in hangars
with high ceilings to allow faster operation of sprinklers by containing the hot gas layer in compartments.
Because of this, additional passive smoke management equipment, such as smoke vents, have not been
provided.
In reality, the presence of draft hangars has the ability to hinder the performance of the sprinkler systems
or ceiling mounted heat detection. If a fire is located directly underneath the draft curtain, the hot gasses
in the smoke plume can be divided, allowing for an increased activation time. This also allows for a fire
to continue to grow to a potentially uncontrollable size before suppression can initiate. Because this
facility is included with a high expansion foam system initiated by optical flame detectors, the draft
curtains could be viewed by some engineers as not mission critical.

4.2

Fire Extinguishers

Fire extinguishers and cabinets are included in this design. The location, type, and size of extinguishers
are indicated on the life safety drawings as shown in the figures below. In accordance with UFC 3-600-01
Section 4-9, portable fire extinguishers shall be installed as required by NFPA 101 and classified in
accordance with NFPA 10 Table 6.2.1.1.
Table 4-1: Fire Extinguisher Installation Requirements Summary
Area

Fire
Classifications

Hazard
Classification

Maximum
Travel
Distance

Maximum
Floor Area Per
Unit of A

General
Industrial
Support

A/B/C

Light Hazard

75 ft.

3,000 SF

Hangar Bay

A/B/C

Light Hazard

50 ft.

1,000 SF

Extinguisher
Rating / Agent
Provided

2A:20B:C
Multi-Purpose Dry
Chemical
4A:40B:C
Multi-Purpose Dry
Chemical

Fire extinguishers within the hangar bays will be spaced along the walls at a maximum of 50 ft. on center.
For those areas within the hangar bays in which the travel distance exceeds 50 ft., typically, the user will
be responsible for providing additional fire extinguishers that support the aircraft. Plans showing the
location and configuration of fire extinguishers are included in Figure 4-2, Figure 4-3, and Figure 4-4.
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This figure is not releasable in accordance with
FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption (b)(4)
refers to those trade secrets or commercial or
financial information that a DOD component
receives from a person or organization outside
the Government with the understanding that the
information or record will be retained on a
privileged or confidential basis in accordance
with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 4-2: Fire Extinguisher Locations - Hangar Bay 3

This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 4-3: Fire Extinguisher Locations – North Support Area
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This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 4-4: Fire Extinguisher Locations – South Support Areas

4.3

Emergency Lighting and Exiting

Emergency lighting and exit signage is provided along the means of egress as required by NFPA 101, in
accordance with the occupancy.

4.4

Interior Finish Ratings

In accordance with UFC 3-600-01 Section 2-6.1, interior wall and ceiling finishes including movable
partitions shall conform to the requirements of NFPA 101. The following table is a compilation of the
requirements for interior finishes in accordance with NFPA 101 Table A.10.2.2. Per NFPA 101 Section
10.2.8.1, where an approved automatic sprinkler system is installed, interior wall and ceiling finish with a
flame spread rating not exceeding Class C is permitted to be used in any location where Class B is
required, and with a rating of Class B in any location where Class A is required.
Table 4-2 includes the reduction in finish ratings allowed for sprinklered buildings per NFPA 101.
Table 4-2: Interior Finish Ratings Summary
Occupancy (NFPA 101)

Exits

Exit Access Corridors

Other Spaces

Industrial
Exit Enclosures

Class C
Class B

Class C
Class C

Class C
Class C

4.5

Life Safety Summary

In summary, the facility complies with the life safety requirements of UFC 3-600-01 and NFPA 101. In
addition to passive life safety measures, the active fire suppression systems installed in this facility are
also included and described in the following section.
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FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

Fire Suppression Requirements

The facility is completely protected by a hydraulically designed automatic sprinkler system in accordance
with UFC 3-600-01. The concealed spaces above suspended ceilings are not provided with sprinklers
because these spaces are noncombustible.
The Hangar support areas are provided with wet-pipe sprinkler systems. The hangar bays are protected
with a low-level high expansion foam deluge system in accordance with ETL 02-15 section A1.3.3 and a
wet-pipe system in accordance with A1.3.2.1 with a temperature monitoring system in accordance with
ETL 02-15 Section A1.5.4. The design accommodates the parking arrangement of KC-46 aircraft.
The type of sprinkler systems for the hangar bays were determined in accordance with ETL 02-15 and is
dependent on the recorded 99.6% Dry-Bulb Temperature as recorded on the Engineering Weather Data
Sheets published by the NOAA. According to ETL 02-15 Section A1.3.2.1 a wet-pipe sprinkler system is
to be used in the aircraft servicing areas in geographic locations having a 99.6% Dry-bulb temperature
greater than 0 Deg F. For this location, the 99.6% Dry Bulb is 4 Deg F and wet-pipe sprinkler systems
have been installed in the hangar bays. For more information on the Engineering Weather Datasheet for
this Air Force Installation, Refer to Appendix E.
There are two fire protection rooms provided in this facility; Room 401 and Room 504. Room 401 serves
as the primary fire protection room while Room 504 is remotely located to meet the high expansion foam
delivery criteria for Hangar Bay 1.
Fire Protection Room 401 includes the buildings two fire pumps and corresponding jockey pump, foam
induction equipment, fire alarm and suppression releasing panels, and a riser manifold with wet-pipe and
foam/water risers serving the East support areas and Hangar Bays 2 and 3. A detailed plan view of Room
401 is included in Figure 5-1.
Fire water is fed from downstream of the fire pumps to Fire Protection Room 504 which includes a riser
manifold with wet-pipe and foam/water risers serving the West support areas and Hangar Bay 1.
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This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 5-1: Detailed Layout of Fire Protection Room 401

5.2

Water Supply

The water supply for the fire protection systems in this facility is provided from two above ground
dedicated fire water storage tanks. The requirements for the fire water supply is given in ETL 02-15 Sec.
1.4.4. Per the code, the base domestic water system is to be used whenever adequate capacity in terms of
flow rate, pressure, and storage capacity is available.
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Fire Hydrants are provided in accordance with UFC 3-600-01. Section 3-7.3.3 requires that a sufficient
number of hydrants must be provided so that the fire flow demand can be met without taking more than
1,250 gpm from any single hydrant. While the UFC 3-600-01 provides hydrant quantity and flow
requirements, the ETL 02-15 provides location requirements for fire hydrants. Per the ETL, hydrants
protecting aircraft hangars are required to be installed at 300 ft. maximum intervals, and there will be at
least one hydrant within 30 meters of each corner of the hangar. Fire hydrants are required to be supplied
from the domestic (potable) water system around the hangar and not fed from the hangar fire protection
water system.
The hydrants provided around the 3-bay hangar meet the criteria of UFC 3-600-01 and ETL 02-15. A map
of the hydrant locations is included in Figure 5-2 below. Additionally, a summary of the flow test results
from these hydrants shown above are provided in Table 5-1:

This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 5-2: Site Hydrant Map
Table 5-1: Hydrant Flow Test Summary Data
Hydrant

Location

Static (PSI)

Residual (PSI)

Flow Rate (GPM)

FH1168
FH1167
FH1114

NW Corner
SW Corner
NE Corner

80
80
88

60
60
60

1271
1271
1271
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The fire water demand for a simultaneous flow of the hangar bay sprinkler system and the low level high
expansion foam systems would exceed the provided fire water supply. Therefore, it has been concluded
the water supply available to this facility is inadequate for the system demand, and dedicated water
storage tanks sized in accordance with ETL 02-15 are required.
Water is fed from Fire protection room 401 to Fire protection room 504. Additionally, the fire water
supply is fed back underground to be used for additional base hangar projects that will occur as part of a
separate construction phase. The fire water demands of the 3-bay hangar are greater than the requirements
of the other hangars to be constructed, therefore, the provided supply will be adequate for the additional
buildings without the upsizing of the fire water tanks in the future.

5.2.1

Fire Water Storage Tanks

To meet the fire water demands of the fire protection systems, two above ground, dedicated fire water
storage tanks have been provided. The required volume of water is determined in accordance with the
means provided in ETL 02-15. Section A1.4.2.3 requires that the provided storage capacity is equal to
120 percent of the maximum demand for 30 minutes. Additionally, the ETL requirements state that the
required storage capacity shall be divided between two equal-sized water tanks, each storing one half the
required volume. The piping configuration must allow water to be supplied by both reservoirs if the other
is out of service.
Per the requirements of ETL 02-15, two 66,000 gallon storage tanks are provided. The full water supply
analysis is included in Appendix B and a summary of the results are shown in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2: Fire Water Supply Calculation Summary

Discharge Duration
Calculated Rate Water/Concentrate
Total Estimated Volume of Water (Flow*Duration)
20% Increase per ETL 02-15
Size of Each Tank Required (2 Tanks)
Size of Each Tank Provided (2 Tanks)

30 min
2,873 gpm
86,190 gal
103,428 gal
51,714 gal
66,000 gal

As required by the ETL 02-15, all fire water storage tanks are to be provided with a low-water-level alarm
and a low-temperature alarm, each transmitting back to the fire department as separate supervisory
signals. External visual water level gauges and automatic refill from the base water distribution system is
also required to be provided on each storage tank. Due to the geographical location of this Air Force Base,
additional freeze protection measures are required per ETL 02-15 Section A1.4.2.4.
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The fire water storage tanks are refilled via the domestic water line. A reduced pressure zone backflow
preventer is provided at the transition point between the domestic potable line and the dedicated fire
suppression line.
Per AFCEC directives, storage tanks shall be completely insulated. Insulation and heat trace systems shall
be provided on all above ground supply piping to and from the storage tanks to a depth no less than the
frost line.

5.3

Fire Pumps

The water pressure and flow requirements of the automatic sprinkler systems and high expansion foam
systems dictate the installation of fire pumps for this hangar. Per ETL 02-15, fire water pump systems are
to be installed in accordance with NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Fire Pumps for
Fire Protection.
The fire pumps for this facility are located in Fire Protection Room 401. ETL 02-15 requires the
installation of a redundant pump and a pressure maintenance pump (jockey pump). The fire pumps are
configured in parallel to maintain operations when the redundancy is needed. A summary of the rated Fire
pump characteristics are included in Table 5-3.
Table 5-3: Fire Pump Characteristics Summary
Fire Pump

Pump Type

Flow Rate (gpm)

Total Head (psi)

Horsepower

Fire Pump 1
Fire Pump 2
Jockey Pump

Horizontal Split Case
Horizontal Split Case
Multi-State Centrifugal

2,500
2,500
25

215
215
135

50
50
10

Additionally, the requirements state that a single water pumping station shall be designed to
accommodate multiple aircraft facilities when practical. Because this building is a part of the first phase
of a 3-phase infrastructure upgrade plan, the pumps in this facility will be used to supply the fire water
demands of two other hangars to be constructed in the future. Because the fire water demands of the 3bay hangar are greater than the demands of the additional hangars to be constructed, the pumps provided
are adequate to support the future fire protection systems in the other buildings.
Pumps are controlled by electric Soft-start controllers. The intent behind a soft start fire pump controller
is to allow for gradual increases and decreases in system flow and pressure to mitigate the effects of water
hammer. When both the pre-action systems and the high expansion foam systems for a hangar bay
operate, a sudden surge in water flow occurs and can be attributed to the wear and tear of piping
networks.
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Automatic Fire Sprinkler Systems

Section 4-2.2 of the UFC 3-600-01 requires the installation of complete automatic sprinkler protection
throughout all new DoD facilities. The sprinkler systems are to be designed in accordance with the
Area/Density method of NFPA 13, except the design densities, design area, hose stream allowance, and
duration of supply requirements must be in accordance with FM Global Datasheet 3-26, Fire Water
Demand for Non-Storage Sprinklered Facilities Tables 1 through 4, including the revised Table 2 in FM
Engineering bulletin. The densities of the automatic sprinkler systems have been summarized in Table
5-4.
Table 5-4: Automatic Fire Sprinkler Design Density Summary
Hazard Classification

System
Type

Density
(GPM/SF)

Remote
Area (SF)

Area Per
Head (SF)

Temperature
Rating

Light Hazard (HC-1)
Ordinary Hazard (HC-2)
Hangar Bay (ETL 02-15)

Wet
Wet
Wet

0.10
0.20
0.20

1,500
2,500
5,000

225
110
110

175 F
200 F
200 F

Wet-pipe risers have been installed for each sprinkler system. Each riser installed follows a typical design
with differing pipe and riser diameters depending on the system demands. The typical wet-pipe riser
detail utilized in this facility is shown in Figure 5-3.

Figure 5-3: Typical Wet-Pipe Sprinkler System Riser
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The components shown in the riser detail above are intentionally included. The most notable component
in this riser is the pressure reducing valve set to a maximum of 160 psi. Because each of the risers are fed
off of a single riser manifold, the pressure demands of the foam/water systems exceed the pressure ratings
of the wet-pipe sprinkler pipe, and therefore, a means of regulating the sprinkler system pressure is
required. In addition to the pressure regulating valve, a 10-gallon hydraulic surge arrestor has been
provided to reduce the effects of water surges and prevent water hammer.

5.4.1

Support Area Sprinkler Protection

Both the East and West support areas are provided with automatic wet-pipe sprinkler systems in
accordance with UFC 3-600-01. The sprinkler systems in each support area are fed from individual wetpipe sprinkler risers located in Room 504 and Room 401 for the West and East support areas,
respectively.
The sprinkler densities used to protect each area in the support spaces have been determined depending on
the classification of the hazards in the space. Light hazard areas including, but not limited to the
break/training room, offices, computer room, and toilets have been protected with a HC-1 sprinkler
density while all shops, testing rooms, Hazmat, and mechanical and storage spaces have been protected
with a HC-2 sprinkler density.
The differences in densities account for the volume of water that would be required in a fire event in that
space. The provided density for HC-1 assumes that for a light hazard space, a potential fire could be
controlled within an area of 1,500 SF, while a HC-2 density assumes that potential fires in that space
could be reasonably controlled by sprinklers within 2,500 SF. Sprinkler density classifications for each
support areas are shown in Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5.
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This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 5-4: Sprinkler Density Classification for West Support Areas

This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.

Figure 5-5: Sprinkler Density Classification for East Support Areas
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Prior to compiling hydraulic calculations, specific sprinklers were selected based on design density and
area conditions. A summary of the selected sprinkler details are listed below:
Light Hazard (HC-1) Areas
Max Coverage per Head:
Density:
Sprinkler:
Temperature Rating:
Finish:
Orifice:
K-Factor:

225 SF
0.10 gpm/sf over 1,500 sf
Reliable Mod F1FR56 QR. Std. Recessed Pendant
175 Deg F
Chrome
1/2”
5.6

Ordinary Hazard (HC-2) Areas
Max Coverage per Head:
Density:
Sprinkler(s):
Temperature Rating:
Finish:
Orifice:
K-Factor:

110 SF (130 SF per ETL 02-15)
0.10 gpm/sf over 1,500 sf
Reliable Mod F1FR LO QR Std. Upright & Pendant models
200 Deg F
Brass
3/4”
8.0

A full set of sprinkler contractor shop drawings have been provided. In the contractors design, a crossmain sprinkler layout is utilized. Hydraulic calculations for the systems have been provided for the
hydraulically most demanding remote area for each support area. A summary of the Hydraulic demands
are included in Table 5-5.
Table 5-5: Support Area Risers Hydraulic Demand Summary
Riser

Location

Size

Flow at BOR

Pressure at BOR

Type

East Support Area
West Support Area

FP Room 401
FP Room 504

4”
4”

118 psi
99 psi

600 gpm
662 gpm

Wet
Wet

Comparing the hydraulic demand for the most demanding support area system to the supply via the pump
curve demonstrates that the system will contain adequate water supply for the systems. The most
demanding hangar bay sprinkler system is shown below in Figure 5-6.

FPE-596

5-28

Z. Ataiyan

Culminating Experience In Fire Protection

Final

3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar

Figure 5-6: Hydraulic Supply and Demand Curve For Support Area Sprinkler System

5.4.2

Hangar Bay Sprinkler Protection

Each hangar bay is provided with an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system in accordance with ETL 02-15
Section A1.3. Because this 3-bay maintenance hangar will be used for fueled aircraft operation, each
sprinkler system riser is to be hydraulically designed as capable of providing 0.2 gpm/SF over the most
remote 5,000 SF in addition to low-level high expansion foam system.
The sprinkler systems in each hangar bay are fed from individual wet-pipe sprinkler risers located in
Room 401 for Hangar Bays 2 and 3, and Room 504 for Hangar Bay 1.

FPE-596

5-29

Z. Ataiyan

Culminating Experience In Fire Protection

Final

3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar

This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption
(b)(4). FOIA exemption (b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or
commercial or financial information that a DOD component receives
from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a
privileged or confidential basis in accordance with the customary
handling of such records.

Figure 5-7: Sprinkler Density Classification for Hangar Bays

Prior to compiling hydraulic calculations, specific sprinklers were selected based on the required design
density and area conditions. A summary of the selected sprinkler details are listed below:
Hangar Bay (ETL 02-15)
Max Coverage per Head:
Density:
Sprinkler:
Temperature Rating:
Finish:
Orifice:
K-Factor:

110 SF
0.20 gpm/SF over 5,000 SF
Reliable Mod F1FR56 QR Std. Upright
200 Deg F
Brass
1/2”
5.6

A full set of sprinkler contractor shop drawings have been provided. In the contractor’s design, a gridded
sprinkler layout is utilized in each hangar. Hydraulic calculations for the systems have been provided for
the hydraulically most demanding remote area for each hangar bay. A summary of the Hydraulic demands
are included in Table 5-6.
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Table 5-6: Hangar Bay Risers Hydraulic Demand Summary
Riser

Location

Size

Flow Demand at BOR

Pressure Demand at BOR

Type

Hangar Bay 1
Hangar Bay 2
Hangar Bay 3

FP Room 504
FP Room 401
FP Room 401

6”
6”
6”

1,240 gpm
1,299 gpm
1,228 gpm

193 psi
188 psi
198 psi

Wet
Wet
Wet

Comparing the hydraulic demand for the most demanding hangar bay system to the supply via the pump
curve demonstrates that the system will contain adequate water supply for the systems. The most
demanding hangar bay sprinkler system is shown below in Figure 5-8.

Figure 5-8: Hydraulic Supply and Demand Curve For Hangar Sprinkler Systems

5.5

High Expansion Foam/Water Deluge System

As required by ETL 02-15, areas used for fueled aircraft are to be protected with a low-level high
expansion foam system designed in accordance with NFPA 11A Standard for Medium and High
Expansion Foam Systems. For this project, the Air Force has included the Draft UFC 4-211-01 as an
applicable standard for the design of the foam/water systems.
High expansion foam is used because it effectively combats the hazards associated with hydrocarbon pool
fires. High expansion foam is able to expand and provide coverage over the surface of a fuel spill fire.
This spreading smothers the flames preventing oxygen from reaching the fire. The mass of the foam
maintains an oxygen deficient area until the fire is suppressed.
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Additionally, as the foam smothers a fire, steam is generated as a result of the radiant heat from the fire,
causing heat removal from the fire via evaporation. This mechanism provides a cooling component and
creates an ambient steam-air mixture significantly below the required oxygen level to support continued
combustion.
Finally, the high expansion foam provides a cooling effect of the fuel via the foam bubbles breaking and
releasing water onto the hot surfaces. This mechanism allows for more effective penetration into burning
materials and provides cooling to the burning material to below its ignition temperature.
The ETL 02-15 and the UFC 4-211-01 share identical foam calculation methods and performance criteria
for foam systems. Where the UFC 4-211-01 differs is with respect to the methods in which the foam
concentrate is proportioned with water to create foam solution. Where traditional foam water risers use a
foam proportioning system with a ratio controller and a pressurized bladder foam concentrate tank, the
UFC 4-211-01 requires a foam induction system with atmospheric foam concentrate tanks. This has
various implications on the design and increases the required pressure necessary for the system to operate
as intended.
Each hangar bay is considered as a separate fire suppression zone and has been separated from other
hangar bays by a 3-hour non-masonry fire rated barrier at the request of the Air Force Chief Fire
Protection Engineer. Each fire suppression zone is fed by an individual foam/water flow control riser and
is initiated in accordance with the methods discussed in Section 6.2.
The performance criteria of the low-level high expansion foam system is given in ETL 02-15 Section
A1.3.3.2. Per the performance criteria, at one minute after foam activation the released foam solution
must cover 90 percent of the aircraft silhouette area projected on the floor. At four minutes, the released
foam solution must cover the entire aircraft servicing area to a depth of one meter (3.2 feet).

5.5.1

Foam/Water System Risers

A total of three foam/water risers are provided in this facility, where each of the three hangar bays are
served by a dedicated riser. The foam/water riser for Hangar Bay 1 is located in Fire Protection room 504
while the foam/water risers for Hangar Bays 2 and 3 are located in Fire Protection Room 401.
Given the ETL 02-15 performance criteria of foam coverage of 90 percent of the projected aircraft
silhouette in one minute or less, it was determined thorough theoretical analysis that a foam/water riser
located in Room 401 would not satisfy the design requirements for Hangar Bay 1. It was determined that
the most cost effective solution to this issue was to provide an additional riser room located near Hangar
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Bay 1. This solution reduced the overall pipe length required from the foam/water risers to the generators
in Hangar Bay 1 and, in turn, allowed the performance criteria of ETL 02-15 to be satisfied.
Where traditional foam/water risers have utilized conventional deluge valves, the UFC 4-211-01 requires
the use of flow control valves. Flow control valves are deluge valves utilizing a unique trim piping
package that allows for greater functionality. One component of the included trim assembly is for the
pressure and flow through the valve to be controlled, ensuring proper operation and proportioning through
the inductor nozzle. For a solenoid to reclose the deluge clapper upon a stop-foam signal. The typical
foam/water riser detail utilized in this facility is shown in Figure 5-9.

Figure 5-9: Typical Foam/Water Riser Layout

A full set of foam system contractor shop drawings have been provided. In the contractor’s design, each
foam/water riser feeds eight (8) Foam generators. Hydraulic calculations for the systems have been
provided for each hangar bay. A summary of the Hydraulic demands are included in Table 5-7.
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Table 5-7: Hangar Bay Foam/Water Risers Hydraulic Demand Summary
Riser

Location

Size

Hangar Bay 1
Hangar Bay 2
Hangar Bay 3

FP Room 504
FP Room 401
FP Room 401

8”
8”
8”

Flow Demand at

Pressure Demand

BOR

at BOR

1,586 gpm
1,581 gpm
1,581 gpm

193 psi
188 psi
198 psi

Type

Foam
Foam
Foam

Comparing the hydraulic demand for the most demanding hangar bay foam system to the water supply via
the pump curve demonstrates that the system will contain adequate water supply for the systems. The
most demanding hangar bay sprinkler system is shown below in Figure 5-10.

Figure 5-10:
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Foam Induction System

Included in the various changes in the UFC 4-211-01 document is the introduction of inducted foam
systems for Air Force high expansion foam systems. In an inducted foam system, an inductor is used
instead of a commonly used ratio controller proportioning system paired with a pressurized foam bladder
tank.
A foam inductor works by utilizing a venturi nozzle to induct foam concentrate from an atmospheric
concentrate tank into the water line, creating foam solution. The following figure will be used to illustrate
the function of the nozzle. A diagram of a venture nozzle is included in Figure 5-11.

Figure 5-11:

Venturi Nozzle Section View Diagram

As the water flows upwards through the riser, the velocity of the water is increased as it passes through
the inductor. This increase in pressure creates a low pressure zone at the narrowest part of the nozzle,
which inducts the foam through the suction line from the foam concentrate storage tank. As the foam
concentrate is inducted, it mixes at the pre-defined concentration by percentage and the solution flows out
of the inductor assembly though the foam/water system piping to the foam generators.
While the inductor nozzle utilizes fluid mechanics laws to mix and create the foam solution, there are
several challenges that must be considered to ensure the system inducts the foam properly. First, the
inductor nozzle diameter is fabricated by the manufacturer prior to installation and is not adjustable.
Because of this, a great detail of coordination is required between the inductor manufacturer and the
system designer. To maintain the proper foam concentration in the solution, the water pressure and
velocity though the inductor must be held constant. To achieve this, a flow control riser is utilized that
controls the flow through the inductor to insure proper foam induction.
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Another challenge of the inductor is that the venturi nozzle can create a large pressure drop. To account
for this loss while ensuring the proper flow and pressure is available, fire pumps have been provided.
For these foam systems, a Fomtec between-flange Z-inductor (BFZ) has been installed. Per the hydraulic
calculations for the foam system, the inductor causes a pressure drop range of 73 to 78 psi for each foam
riser. The inductors are installed between a minimum 10 pipe diameters of straight pipe in this facility as
required per the UFC 4-211-01. Figure 5-12 below includes an image of the Fomtec BFZ 6” Inductor.
`

Figure 5-12:

5.5.3

Images of Fomtec BFZ 6" Inductor Standalone and Installed in Application

Ceiling Mounted Foam Generators

The high expansion foam solution is distributed though ceiling mounted foam generators in accordance
with the UFC 4-211-01 Design Criteria. The high expansion foam generators work by spraying the foam
solution onto the foam screen while entraining air into the mixture via a blower fans, thereby creating a
sudsy foam. As the foam flows through the generator it falls from the ceiling level and contacts the floor,
where the foam spreads radially to provide complete coverage around the aircraft silhouette, and
eventually the entire aircraft servicing area.
Per ETL 02-15 and UFC 4-211-01, the foam generators are to be installed in close proximity, but not
directly upon the aircraft. Additionally, the foam generator discharge pattern is not to be obstructed by
structural member or where the floor is obstructed by service equipment (e.g. crane travel path).
Generators are not to be located where the discharge patterns would block exits from the hangar bay
within the first minute of discharge. Figure 5-13 includes a diagram of a high expansion foam riser.
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Diagram of ANSUL JET-X-27 High Expansion Foam Generator

Each hangar bay in the 3-bay maintenance hangar is provided with 8 high expansion foam generators. Six
generators are located towards the front of the aircraft along the sides of the fuselage and 2 generators are
located just behind the wings near the fuselage. The high expansion foam generators are required to be
seismically mounted in accordance with ETL 02-15 regardless of the locations seismic design category.
The foam distribution for this layout has been simulated mathematically and determined that the
performance requirements should be met with enough of a safety factor upon system activation. Final
acceptance of the system would occur during the final commissioning witnessed by the engineer of record
and the Air Force Chief FPE.
A risk of installing the generators in the incorrect location is that the performance criteria may not be
achieved. If the generators are configured such that they discharge partly or fully onto the aircraft, the
foam solution is not able to spread radially as designed. The manner in which the foam spreads across the
hangar floor is essential for meeting the design criteria and ensuring proper blanketing of any liquid pools
that may exist as the fire source.

5.6

Fire Suppression Summary

In summary, the fire suppression systems installed in this facility are in compliance with the ETL 2015
and UFC 4-211-01. Related to the functionality of the sprinkler and foam suppression systems are the
occupant notification and releasing logic of the systems. These components are addressed in the following
Section.
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FIRE DETECTION, ALARM, AND RELEASING SYSTEMS

Fire Alarm and Mass Notification Systems

The 3-bay maintenance hangar is provided with a fully addressable and electronically supervised fire
alarm and mass notification system with battery backup in accordance with NFPA 72 as required by UFC
3-600-01 section 5-3.1 and UFC 4-021-01. The design also meets the requirements of ETL 02-15.

6.1.1

Fire Alarm and Mass Notification Panel

The Fire Alarm and Mass Notification System (MNS) panel is located in Room 401. Per UFC 3-600-01
section 5-4.2.7, the control panel is required to be located in a year-round environmentally conditioned
area that complies with the environmental conditions included in the panels listing. Room 401 is normally
conditioned and meets this criterion.
The fire alarm/mass notification system used in this facility is an addressable Notifier system. The
signaling line circuits (SLC), notification appliance circuits (NAC), and speaker circuits are fed off the
fire alarm control panel (FACP) and 3 additional power supply units. Additionally, a total of 7 amplifiers
are used for the speaker circuits throughout the facility.
A total of 4 local operating consoles (LOC) are provided throughout the hangar bay. Two of the LOCs are
located in hangar bays 1 and three while the other two LOCs are located in the corridors of each support
space.
Both Class A and Class B raceways are used in the SLC and NAC circuits.

6.1.1.1

Fire Alarm Functional Matrix

As required per NFPA 72, a functional programming matrix has been provided for the fire alarm and
mass notification system in this facility. The matrix addresses the applicable alarm, trouble, and
supervisory conditions, and the resulting actions taken by the control panel. The fire alarm functional
matrix for this facility is shown in Figure 6-1.
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Figure 6-1: FACP Functional Matrix

6.1.2

Fire Alarm Initiating Devices

The fire alarm system is initiated through a variety of both manual and automatic methods. The manual
initiating method include manual fire alarm pull stations located within 5ft of each exit in the hangar bay
and support areas in accordance with UFC 3-600-01 Section 5-3.2.1.
The automatic alarm initiating methods include the smoke detector located over the fire alarm control
panel in accordance with NFPA 72 and each water flow switch located on the wet-pipe sprinkler risers.
Water flow switches are set to a 60 second retard delay in accordance with the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01.
The fire alarm system will also initiate from the signal from the fire suppression control panel (FSCP)
upon a foam release. For additional information on the foam releasing systems, refer to Section 6.2.
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Fire Alarm Notification Appliances

All areas of this facility are provided with audible and visual notification. A speaker or horn is not
required in every room of the support areas, however, the speaker or horn performance is required to still
meet the sound power and intelligibility requirements of NFPA 72 and UFC 4-021-01. The requirements
of the UFC 3-600-01 require the installation of white strobes labeled ‘ALERT’ for the fire alarm and
mass notification systems. Strobes are provided throughout the support areas in accordance with the
strobe rating and spacing requirements of NFPA 72 section 18.5.5.4.
Visual notification in the hangar bay is installed in accordance with the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 Section 36.19.14.2. The requirements state that strobes shall be spaced in accordance with the room spacing
requirements of NFPA 72 unless full coverage cannot be attained. In this case, visual notification is not
required in the center of the hangar bay. Instead, strobes rated for a minimum 177 cd are to be placed
around the perimeter of the hangar bay in center to center intervals not exceeding 68 ft and no greater
than 34 ft from a perpendicular wall or hangar bay door opening. Due to the area of each hangar bay in
this facility, the alternative method has been used.

6.1.4

Mass Notification Design Criteria

The DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 refers to UFC 4-021-01, Mass Notification Systems, for the design criteria
for the mass notification system. UFC 4-021-01 Section 4-6.1.2 gives the requirements for intelligibility
of the communicated messages. A common intelligibility score (CIS) of 0.8 is required to be achieved in
the most remote area of each room of the support spaces. A visual metric displaying the CIS scale is
shown in Figure 6-2.

Figure 6-2: Speech Transmission Index versus Common Intelligibility Score Scale

In areas of the building provided with hard wall and ceiling surfaces (such as metal or concrete) that are
found to cause excessive sound reflections are permitted to have a CIS score of no less than 0.6 with a 0.8
CIS score attainable within a 33ft walking distance in the same area. This criteria is helpful is designing a
satisfactory voice messaging system in the hangar bays where the ceiling height is at least 75ft.
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UFC 4-211-01 requires the tone used preceding a fire alarm message to be the three tone temporal pattern
introduced in NFPA 72 Section 18.4.2.1. In general, this pattern serves as a distinctive evacuation signal
to the building occupants. NFPA 72 Section 10.10 requires that alarm signals be distinctive in sounds and
not used for any other purpose. For this reason, only the prerecorded fire message broadcast over the
voice evacuation system uses this tone pattern. All other messages are preceded by a 5 second horn. A
diagram of the three tone temporal pattern as shown in NFPA 72 is included in Figure 6-3.

Figure 6-3: Three Tone Temporal Pattern Parameters

6.1.4.1

Mass Notification Messages

The following prerecorded messages have been provided. The mass notification messages in this facility
are narrated by a female voice and state the following messages which are listed in order of priority. Once
the message has finished playing, there is 2 second pause before the tone and message is repeated until
the system is turned off at the panel or LOC.
1. Three Pulse Temporal Pattern <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have
your attention please. A fire emergency has been reported in the building. Please leave the
building by the nearest exit.”
2. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have
your attention please. A bomb threat has been reported in the building. Please leave the building
by the nearest exit.”
3. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have
your attention please. An intruder or hostile person has been reported in the building. Please take
cover within the building.”
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4. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have
your attention please. Please take cover within the building until further notice.”
5. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have
your attention please. Evacuate the building by other than normal main exits.”
6. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have
your attention please. A weather emergency has been reported in this area. Please take cover
within the building.”
7. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have
your attention please. All clear. The emergency has ended.”
8. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have
your attention please. This is a test of the mass notification system”
9. (Male voice) “May I have your attention please. May I have your attention please. A foam release
has been reported in the building. Please walk to the nearest exit.”
o

(There would be a two second delay and then the alert tone and message would continue to
cycle until the panel was reset by emergency responders)

10. (Spare – No message)

6.1.5

Voltage Drop and Battery Backup Calculations

The requirements for voltage drop calculations are provided in NFPA 72 Section 7.2.1. For the system
installed in this facility, a total of 12 circuits have been calculated. Each circuit is energized with a
terminal voltage of 20.4 volts. Some of the calculations are conducted using the running total length
method, while others are conducted using the lump sum calculation method. A summary of the voltage
drop calculations for the fire alarm and mass notification systems are included in Table 6-1.
Table 6-1: Fire Alarm and Mass Notification System Voltage Drop Calculations Summary

Circuit ID

FACP-SIG1
FACP-SIG2
PS/Amp1-SIG5
PS/Amp1-SIG6
PS/Amp1-SIG7
PS/Amp1-SIG8
PS/Amp2-SIG9
PS/Amp2-SIG10
PS/Amp2-SIG11
PS/Amp2-SIG12
FPE-596

# Dev

Total
Length

Total
Current

Gauge

V Drop %

V Drop
(Volts)

Max
Length

12
9
4
4
5
5
11
10
5
5

518’-7
746’-11
429’-1
947’-10
724’-2
807’-7
445’-8
314’-0
242’-7
327’-7

1690 mA
1113 mA
1124 mA
1124 mA
1405 mA
1405 mA
1265 mA
1043 mA
1967 mA
1405 mA

#12
#12
#12
#12
#12
#12
#12
#12
#12
#12

9.91%
4.63%
7.87%
20.16%
19.25%
21.48%
5.86%
6.20%
6.40%
7.82%

2.0208
0.9454
1.6053
4.113
3.9265
4.382
1.1962
1.2642
1.3048
1.595

470’-1
376’-2
375’-11
506’-8
375’-11
375’-11
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# Dev

Total
Length

Total
Current

Gauge

V Drop %

V Drop
(Volts)

Max
Length

4
3

358’-8
473’-7

1124 mA
843 mA

#12
#12

7.64%
7.56%

1.5576
1.5424

469’-9
626’-4

PS/Amp2-SIG5
PS/Amp2-SIG6

UFC 3-600-01 provides the applicable requirements for secondary power to the fire alarm system. In
accordance with section 5-3.5, the requirements for secondary power for mass notification systems are
determined per UFC 4-021-01.
In accordance with UFC 4-021-01 section 4-4.5, power supply features are required to maintain battery
backup power to supply power no less than that specified in NFPA 72. NFPA 72 Section 10.6.7.2.1.4
requires 48 hours of standby power, followed by 15 minutes of full load operation. Additionally, the
determined power requirements are required to include a minimum 20 percent safety factor. From these
requirements, the system requires a total of 307.8 amp-hours (Ah). The calculations for the FACP and
both power supply cabinets have been summarized in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2: Fire Alarm and Mass Notification Backup Battery Calculation Summary

Battery
Calculation

Total
Standby
(Amps)

Total
Alarm
(Amps)

Standby
Requirement
(48 Hrs)(Ah)

Alarm
Requirement
(15 Min)(Ah)

Battery
Requirement
(Ah)

Battery
Requirement
+ 20% (Ah)

FACP
PS/Amp1
PS/Amp2

2385.2
1800.0
901.0

9375.5
17820.0
22359.0

114.5
86.4
43.2

2.3
4.5
5.6

116.8
90.9
48.8

140.2
109.0
58.6

6.2

Fire Suppression Releasing Systems

The high expansion foam systems discussed in section 0 have been designed in accordance with the
DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 and require specific releasing mechanisms and procedures. The systems provided
for the foam water systems are to be provided independent of the buildings fire alarm and mass
notification systems and shall not be used for any additional purposes.
Both manual and automatic means of system activation have been provided per the UFC 4-211-01. A new
requirement of the UFC 4-211-01 is the requirement of foam stop stations which can halt the flow of
foam, even if it is already flowing from the generators, upon an inadvertent activation.
Audible and visual notification of a foam system activation is provided in the hangar bay via voice
messaging and blue rotating beacons.
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Suppression Releasing Panel

A dedicated releasing panel completely separate from all other systems is required per the DRAFT UFC
4-211-01 section 3-16.19. The foam releasing panel shall be used only for the release of the foam systems
and no other purpose. This procedure is to reduce the occurrence of inadvertent system activations, which
has historically been an issue with these systems for the Air Force.
The releasing panel is required to be located in a normally environmentally conditioned space. This panel
is located adjacent the fire alarm control panel in Room 401.
For this facility, a Det-Tronics Eagle Quantum Premier releasing panel has been provided in accordance
with Section 5-6.3. The purpose for the selection of this panel by the Air Force is due to its programmable
logic controls and voting capabilities. Voting differs from the traditional mechanism of cross-zoning by
observing only the simultaneous signals from any of the detection devices monitored by the panel.
Additional information on the voting system is included in Section 6.2.1.1.

6.2.1.1

Releasing Systems Functional Matrix

The DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 provides the minimum programming requirements for releasing panels in Air
Force hangars. The foam releasing mechanisms are for this system include both automatic and manual
means of activation.
The foam system is released by manual releasing stations located in internals along the normal path of
egress travel. Upon activation of a releasing station, the flow control valve solenoid is energized, opening
the valve. Manual foam stop stations utilizing a “dead-man” switch are also provided in the hangar to halt
the release of foam. When held down continuously, the flow control valve will close within 15 seconds.
For additional information on the manual foam releasing and stop stations, refer to section 6.2.2.
The foam systems are released automatically when the releasing panel receives two simultaneous votes
from optical flame detection in the hangar bay. When a signal is received by the panel, it registers as an
instantaneous “vote”. When the programmed voting criteria is met, the system is released. For this
facility, the releasing panel monitors the signals from the optical flame detectors in each hangar bay and
releases the foam system upon receiving two simultaneous votes. The provided manual stop stations are
capable of halting the release of foam initialized by the optical flame detection.
The functional matrix provided in UFC 4-211-01 is shown in Figure 6-4. This releasing matrix closely
resembles that of the system installed in this facility, with the exception of the heat-detectors associated
pre-action system. A pre-action system is not provided in this facility.
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Figure 6-4: Releasing System Functional Matrix for the Air Force

6.2.2

Manual Foam Start/Stop Devices

The high expansion foam systems in this facility are required to be provided with a manual means of
activation in accordance with DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 section 3-6.19.8. Per this requirement,
“distinctively different” manual foam releasing stations from the manual fire alarm pull stations are
required. Manual releasing stations are required to be NEMA 4 rated, yellow in color, and include the
lettering “FOAM” on the front of the station. Additionally, clear plastic tamper covers capable of
producing an audible alarm are required over the device. Conventional pull station devices are required to
be used instead of addressable components. Lastly, foam releasing stations are required to be of the
locking type that when activated require a key to be reset. Clear and distinct signage is also required for
the manual foam releasing stations. A diagram of the manual foam start station installation requirements
are shown below in Figure 6-5.
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Figure 6-5: Manual Foam Releasing Station Diagram

The manual foam releasing station assembly shown in the figure above is required to be located within
the hangar bay so they are unobstructed, readily accessible, and located in the natural egress path to each
required exit or exit access. Additionally, a maximum linear spacing of 200 ft between manual foam
releasing stations around the perimeter of the hangar bay, not including the hangar bay door, is not to be
exceeded. Manual foam releasing stations are required to maintain a minimum separation distance of 5 ft
from general fire alarm pull stations to avoid unintentional system activations.
A new requirement of the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 are manual foam stop stations that are able to halt the
release of foam even after the deluge valve on the foam riser has been released. Section 3-6.19.9 requires
the installation of NEMA 4 rated manual foam stop stations of the “dead-man” type within 12 inches
from each manual foam releasing station. In addition to the manual stop stations, distinct signage is to be
provided at each device. A detailed view of the device and accompanying signage is shown below in
Figure 6-6.
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Figure 6-6: Manual Foam Stop Station

The manual foam stop station operates as long as the push button is depressed and held down. The system
is to be designed such that the stop station prevents/stops discharge of the foam/water system regardless
of whether or not the system was activated automatically or manually, and whether or not the activation
occurs prior to or after the stop station is pressed and held. The system is also to be design such that the
time to fully close the flow control valve on the foam/water riser does not exceed 15 seconds under full
flow. Where the foam/water system is still in alarm, the system is to be designed such that time to fully
open the flow control valve does not exceed 5 seconds upon release.

6.2.3

Automatic Foam Initiation Devices

In addition to manual releasing stations, automatic means of foam activation is required per the DRAFT
UFC 4-211-01. Section 3-6.19.11 requires the installation of optical flame detection and provides
installation requirements.
Section 5-6.3 provides Air Force specific criteria for optical flame detection. Per this section, Det-Tronics
X3301 Multispectrum IR Flame Detectors are to be used in conjunction with the Det-Tronics Eagle
Quantum Premier Releasing Panel discussed in Section 6.2.1. Det-Tronics has manufactured a model of
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the X3301 flame detector that includes a software feature marketed as “Hangar Mode”. According to the
manufacturer, Hangar Mode detectors provide relay outputs for fires after an increased verification time
to a sustained fire. The detector has been optimized to provide a longer processing time to fires while still
maintaining the extended detection range. The purpose of this additional validation is to reduce nuisance
alarms and inadvertent foam system activations due to false fire detection.
The optical flame detection is provided in the hangar bay such that all areas of each hangar bay are within
the cone-of-vision of at least three detectors. Because of the single aircraft wing area of exceeds 1000 SF,
a minimum of two OFDs covering the aircraft silhouette on each side of the fuselage have been provided.
A sample schematic of a proposed OFD layout that includes six (6) OFDs is included in Figure 6-7.

Figure 6-7: Optical Flame Detector Layout in Hangar Bay 3

The detectors are angled and provided with field of view inhibitors (blinders) such that the cone of vision
is contained within the hangar bay such that it does not extend more than 5 ft outside the hangar bay.
Detectors are mounted per Det-Tronics specifications at approximately 8 ft above the finished floor.
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Additionally, 5 ft of flexible conduit is provided at each detector to allow or minor adjustments during
testing or changes in the mission of the hangar.

6.2.4

Foam System Notification Appliances

In accordance with the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01, dedicated visual notification of a foam release in the
hangar bays are to be provided. Per section 5-6.4 blue rotating beacons that are rated no less than 400 cd
powered from a dedicated emergency power panel. The initiation of the beacons is to be exclusively
controlled though the releasing panel.
Per the Draft UFC 4-211-01, beacons shall be mounted 20-30 ft above the floor of the hangar bay. For
single door hangars, like each of the hangar bays in this facility, a beacon shall be centered on each wall
and accompanied by signs located next to each beacon that reads “FOAM RELESASE WHEN
ILLUMINATED” in red lettering not less than 3 inches high. The accompanying signage requirement
seeks to ensure that building occupants can clearly identify the purpose of this type of notification.
In previous design standards, blue strobes were used in the hangar bay to notify occupants of a foam
release. This often lead to trouble, however, because the drastic derating of the strobe by the blue lens was
often not accounted for during design and resulted in a nearly undeterminable visual signal.
During the event of a foam system release in any of the three hangars, a message will play throughout
each hangar bay and both support areas over the emergency voice communication system notifying
occupants of a foam discharge in the hangar bay.

6.2.5

Foam System Voltage Drop and Backup Battery Calculations

The requirements of the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 state that only devices required for the release of the
foam system are permitted to be connected to the releasing panel. For this facility, only the optical flame
detectors and the flow control valve solenoids are connected to the panel. The releasing panel receives
22.0 volts from the power supply and, after conductor losses, supplies 21.2 volts to each connected
device. Each device is connected to directly to the panel without the use of junction boxes in accordance
with the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01. The releasing panel voltage drop calculations are included in Table 6-3.
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Table 6-3: Releasing Panel Voltage Drop Calculations

Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary

Device

Distance
(ft)

Current
Draw
(Amps)

AWG

Voltage
Drop

Voltage at
device end

Power supply to Panel
Panel to Flame Det 101_1
Panel to Flame Det 101_2
Panel to Flame Det 101_3
Panel to Flame Det 101_4
Panel to Flame Det 101_5
Panel to Flame Det 101_6
Panel to Riser Solenoid 1
Panel to Riser Solenoid 2
Panel to Riser Solenoid 3
Panel to Flame Det 201_1
Panel to Flame Det 201_2
Panel to Flame Det 201_3
Panel to Flame Det 201_4
Panel to Flame Det 201_5
Panel to Flame Det 201_6
Panel to Flame Det 301_1
Panel to Flame Det 301_2
Panel to Flame Det 301_3
Panel to Flame Det 301_4
Panel to Flame Det 301_5
Panel to Flame Det 301_6

20
405
625
420
220
400
400
200
50
110
220
240
345
110
400
400
110
325
540
320
400
400

6.4
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16

#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14
#14

0.8 V
0.4 V
0.6 V
0.4 V
0.2 V
0.4 V
0.4 V
0.6 V
0.2 V
0.3 V
0.2 V
0.2 V
0.3 V
0.1 V
0.4 V
0.4 V
0.1 V
0.3 V
0.5 V
0.3 V
0.4 V
0.4 V

21.2 V
20.8 V
20.6 V
20.8 V
21.0 V
20.8 V
20.8 V
20.6 V
21.0 V
20.9 V
21.0 V
21.0 V
20.9 V
21.1 V
20.8 V
20.8 V
21.1 V
20.9 V
20.7 V
20.9 V
20.8 V
20.8 V

Observing the results of the calculations, minor voltage drops occur at each device the fed from the panel.
This confirms that the minimum operating voltages of the connected devices will be provided.
Additionally, backup battery requirements were determined in accordance with NFPA 72 section
10.6.7.2.1.4, which requires 48 hours of standby power followed by 15 minutes of full load operation. For
this releasing panel, the total battery amp hours required, including the 20% safety factor, is 229 amp
hours. The backup battery calculation is summarized in Table 6-4.
Table 6-4: Releasing Panel Backup Battery Calculation Summary

Battery
Calculation

Total
Standby
(Amps)

Total
Alarm
(Amps)

Standby
Requirement
(48 Hrs)(Ah)

Alarm
Requirement
(15 Min)(Ah)

Battery
Requirement
(Ah)

Battery
Requirement
+ 20% (Ah)

FSCP

3.95

6.40

189.6

1.59

191.19

229.43
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Fire Detection, Alarm, and Releasing Summary

Overall, the provided detection, alarm, and releasing systems meet the intent and are in compliance with
the UFC 3-600-01, UFC 4-211-01, and UFC 4-021-01.
At this point in the prescriptive analysis, all major systems have been addressed. The following section
evaluates a performance based validation of the provided systems.
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PERFORMANCE BASED DESIGN ANALYSIS

Performance Based Design Overview

To determine the effectiveness of the prescriptive codes and standards, a performance based fire
protection and life safety analysis has been conducted. The analysis follows the methods presented in
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code - Chapter 5 and the SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire
Protection: Analysis and Design of Buildings. The following chapter contains a detailed analysis of the
effects of a jet fuel pool fire located underneath a wing of a KC-46 parked in Hangar Bay 3.

7.1.1

Project Scope

The following analysis will evaluate a fire in Hangar Bay 3. The hangar bays in this analysis will include
the fire protection systems discussed in Sections 1.0 through 6.0 of this report including;


A low-level high expansion foam/water system designed to meet the requirements of ETL 02-15,
and UFC 4-211-01,



and voting multispectrum IR optical flame detection used to initiate the foam system

The overall outcome of the analysis and evaluation shall be to the approval of the USAF Fire Protection
Engineer, Base Commander, design team, and any other unnamed stakeholders.

7.1.2

Identifying Goals

Success of this evaluation will depend on the defined goals of the USAF for the protection of this facility.
The goals that will be used for this analysis include the following:


Providing life safety for the building occupants and emergency responders.



Protection of the three KC-46 aircraft and the 3-Bay Maintenance Hangar.



Maintaining continuity of aircraft maintenance operations.

Life safety goals will be achieved though reducing the required safe egress time through effective
occupant notification, via mass notification systems, upon the earliest fire detection possible initiated by
optical flame detection.
The protection of the aircraft and hangar facility will be accomplished through appropriate fire
suppression systems that will be initiated while the fire is still in its incipient stage.
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Stakeholder and Design Objectives

Historically, the USAF has placed a greater emphasis on the protection of the hangar from a fire incident
than the protection of the aircraft during a fire incident. Evolutions of design standards have worked to
change the priorities from an infrastructure protection consideration to an aircraft protection
consideration.
There have been numerous studies conducted on the effects of radiant heat exposure to aircraft composite
materials. Results from these studies conclude that the time of exposure to various heat fluxes dictate the
time of exterior coating delamination. As delamination occurs, the residual mechanical strength in flexure
is diminished and the tensile strength of the materials are greatly reduced [1].
Limiting the exposure time of critical radiant heat flux to the aircraft in accordance with Error!
Reference source not found. by the application of high expansion foam has been established as a design
objective by the stakeholders.

7.1.4

Performance Criteria

Defining any and all performance criteria is dependent on the criteria defined by the building codes and
project stakeholders. As explained in Section 7.1.2, overall objectives of the USAF are to preserve life
and preserve the integrity of the aircraft. The performance criteria for this analysis has been divided into
two categories;


Life Safety Criteria



Aircraft Protection Criteria

The life safety criteria specified will serve to regulate the thresholds of fire effects which the building
occupants would be exposed. Aircraft Protection Criteria will examine the physical limits of the aircraft
when exposed to fires of various sizes.

7.1.4.1

Life Safety Performance Criteria

The primary life safety performance criteria has been established in accordance with NFPA 101 Section
5.2.2. This section requires that any occupant who is not intimate with ignition shall not be exposed to
instantaneous or cumulative untenable conditions. Due to the nature of the fire scenario evaluated in this
analysis, it is hypothesized that occupants in Hangar Bay 3 will have ample time to egress out of the
building before the smoke or toxic gas layer descents to a height of 6 ft above the highest walking surface
in the hangar bay. The timing of this evacuation means that no occupant is exposed to instantaneous or
cumulative untenable conditions.
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This performance criteria was chosen because it addresses the occupant’s ability to egress in a scenario
where the smoke is not extracted from the space or area. Because the hangar bay does not include heat or
smoke vents, ensuring adequate occupant egress is of key importance. For this reason, Method 2 as
defined in Section A.5.2.2 of the Life Safety Code has been chosen as the primary life safety performance
criteria for this analysis.

7.1.4.2

Aircraft Protection Criteria

At the time of this analysis, the USAF has not publically released documentation concerning acceptable
thresholds for aircraft damage in the event of a fire. Therefore, engineering judgement has been applied to
establish unique criteria for this facility and the aircraft therein. The following bulleted list includes stated
assumptions for this analysis


The aircraft is constructed on aluminum alloys and stainless steel



10 seconds for full fire development based on a flame spread rate of 1.35 m/s.



Stainless steel and aluminum fuselages will reach yield strength in 15 to 35 seconds when
exposed to a radiant heat flux of 90 kW/m2 per the study – Prediction of Aircraft Damage Time in
Post-Crash Fires

Depending on the conditions, hangar fires can cause significant damage to the aircraft such that it would
be considered as irreparable. Inoperable/irreparable aircraft threaten the continuity of operations for the
USAF, which can lead to further logistical issues and excessive financial burden.
Further, the potential fuel loading contained in the wing fuel tanks of the aircraft possess the greatest fire
hazard to the aircraft and building structure. For this reason, the metric that will be used in this analysis
will be the time that the aircraft is exposed to radiant heat fluxes that have been determined to cause the
aluminum alloys to yield.
Finally, the effect of early suppression via the high expansion foam system will be incorporated into the
analysis to determine if the aircraft will reach yield strength.

7.2

Design Fire Scenarios

In accordance with NFPA 101 section 5.5.3, the guidelines for Design Fire Scenario 1 have been adopted
for this analysis.
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Regarding Design Fire Scenario 1, Section 5.5.3.1 states that the fire scenario shall be described as an
occupancy-specific fire representative of a typical fire for the occupancy. It is required that the scenario
account for the following items:


Occupant Activities



Number and Location of Occupants



Room Size



Contents and Furnishings



Fuel Properties and Ignition Sources



Ventilation Conditions



Identification of the first item ignited and its location

In this aircraft hangar, a typical fire for the occupancy would be a JP-8 pool fire located underneath one of
the wings of the aircraft.
The design fire scenario for this analysis assumes an occupied hangar during routine on aircraft
maintenance operations. The left aircraft wing experiences failure in a drain valve causing JP-8 fuel to
begin spilling onto the hangar floor. Upon maintenance personnel successfully halting the flow of fuel
from the wing, approximately 3-5 minutes, 60 gallons of JP-8 has spilled onto the floor and has spread
radially outwards. Additional information on the size of the fuel spill is given in Section 0.
The fuel is unintentionally ignited by a maintenance technician that is arc welding near the hangar door.
The torch is dropped while operating and makes contact with the edge of the spill, igniting the fuel. The
flame spreads along the surface of the spill until the entire surface area is involved. There are no
additional combustible materials within proximity to the fire and the fire does not spread.
During the fire, the hangar door is closed and oxygen available to the hangar bay is limited to the air
present in the room at the time of ignition.

7.2.1

Assumptions

As part of this performance based analysis, the following assumptions have been made about the
conditions at the hangar.


Hangar is occupied by personnel performing routine maintenance operations at the time of the
spill
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Upon ignition, the fire detection systems work as intended and the performance criteria of the
foam/water system is effectively met.

7.2.2

Building Characteristics

Due to the geometry of the fuel spill and the distance from all walls and doors, it has been assumed that
the fire will be controlled by the fire suppression systems prior to spreading to the rest of the building.

7.2.3

Occupant Characteristics.

The occupant characteristics for this facility have been defined in accordance with NFPA 101 section
5.4.5. In general, this facility will be occupied by enlisted personnel, officers, and civilians contracted by
the USAF.

7.2.3.1

Response Characteristics

Due to the nature of this facility, it has been assumed that all normal building occupants will be active
USAF personnel and will thereby differ from a general population in terms of sensibility, reactivity,
mobility, and susceptibility.
Sensibility – Because this facility is located on an active duty Air Force installation and is populated with
military personnel, it is assumed that all building occupants possess the ability to sense the sounding of an
alarm and discern unusual visual cues.
Reactivity – It is assumed that occupants are capable of interpreting cues correctly and responding
appropriately. Mandated emergency response training and regular fire drills performed by building
occupants reinforce this assumption. For this analysis, it has been assumed that hangar occupants will not
act to manually initiate foam suppression systems, although this is likely in reality.
Mobility – Building occupants are assumed to possess the appropriate mobility for working on, near, or
around large aircraft. Published USAF physical fitness requirements for both enlisted personnel and
officers reinforce this assumption.
Susceptibility – It is assumed that building occupants are in generally good health and do not possesses
physical ailments that would prohibit them from self-preservation during the early stages of a fire event.

7.2.3.2

Location

It is assumed at the time of the fire that each normally occupied space in the hangar bay and support areas
will contain at least one building occupant located at the most remote point from the nearest available
exit.
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Number of Occupants

Per NFPA 101 Section 5.4.5.4, this analysis shall be based on the maximum number of people that every
occupied room or area is expected to contain. For this scenario, the occupant load calculated in Section
3.1 will be used to represent the number of occupants in the hangar bay and rest of the building.

7.2.3.4

Staff Assistance

It is assumed that building occupants who regularly perform maintenance operations in this facility are
familiar with the procedures in manually initializing the foam fire suppression systems. However, for the
purpose of this analysis observing the effects of the automatic systems, it is assumed that the manual
foam releasing stations discussed in Section 6.2.2 are not used.

7.3

ASET versus RSET Analysis

To determine if the life safety performance criteria specified in Section 7.1.4.1 is met, a comparative
analysis of the available safe egress time (ASET) and the required safe egress time (RSET) has been
conducted. The concept of an ASET versus RSET analysis is introduced in the SFPE Handbook of Fire
Protection Engineers in Chapter 3-12, Evacuation Time by Proulx ET. AL. A diagram from chapter 3-12
is included in Figure 7-1.

Figure 7-1: Available Safe Egress Time Milestones

Because the fire in this scenario occurs in the hangar bay, the time for the smoke layer to descent to a
height of 6ft above the hangar floor was expected to be greater than the required egress time from the
hangar.
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Available Safe Egress Time Determination

The ASET for this scenario was determined by evaluating at what time the tenability limit specified in
Section 7.1.4.1 occurs. The methods used for this analysis were selected from Chapter 3-9 of the SFPE
HB. Using the geometrical properties of the hangar bay, the design fire parameters, and the tenability
limits, the time for the smoke layer to descend to a height of 6ft above the floor was determined using the
equation below:
𝑛

1/(1+ )
3
𝐴𝑠
4/3
(
)
𝐻
−2/3
(𝑛 + 3) 𝐻 2
𝑧𝐿
𝑡= {
[( )
− 1]}
2
𝐻
𝑘𝜐 𝛼𝑛 1/3

The time for the smoke layer to descend to a height of 6ft above the floor was determined to be 224
seconds (3.7 Minutes). For a complete analytical solution and determination of the available safe egress
time, refer to Appendix F.
It should be noted that applying this method of smoke decent to a fire of this magnitude provides a
conservative time for ASET. In reality, as the smoke layer descends to the top of the flame, the rate at
which the smoke layer descends will significantly decrease. This phenomenon is caused when the oxygen
being entrained into the plume is displaces by the descending smoke layer. In essence, the fire is
smothered by its own entrained combustion products. Therefore, a decent time of 224 seconds in the
hangar bay is a conservative figure for this analysis.

7.3.2

Required Safe Egress Time Determination

The RSET for this facility has been determined in accordance with the methods presented in SFPE HB
Chapter 3-13. From this chapter, the following equation for determining RSET is provided:
𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑇 = 𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑛 + 𝑡𝑝−𝑒 + 𝑡𝑒
Where:

td = Time from fire ignition to detection; that is, the detection phase
tn = Time from detection to notification of occupants of a fire emergency; that is the notification
phase
tp-e = Time from notification (or cue reception) until evacuation commences; that is, the preevacuation phase
te = Time from the start of purposive evacuation movement until safety is reached; that is, the
evacuation phase
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Detection and Notification Phases

The detection phase has been assumed based on two factors. The first factor accounts for the event that
the hangar occupants would detect the fire upon ignition prior to the optical flame detectors located in the
hangar bay. The second factor accounts for the fire detection via optical flame detection. Of these cases,
the detection by OFD provides a greater time to activation and, therefore, has been used for this analysis.
Whether the fire is detected manually or automatically, the detection phase will be relatively short. For
the purposes of this analysis, the detection and notification phases have combined into one time. From the
initiation of the fire, it is assumed there will be 10 seconds before the fire is observed by the optical flame
detectors. This figure has been derived from Det-Tronics published data on X3301 Optical Flame
Detectors installed with “Hangar Mode”. From the published data, the detectors are capable of detecting a
2x2 ft JP-5 pool fire on medium sensitivity in 9 seconds on average. Using this figure for the detection
time, and assuming a notification time of 1 second yields a combined time of 10 seconds has been used.

7.3.2.2

Pre-evacuation Phase

The pre-evacuation time for this facility has been determined in accordance with SFPE HB Chapter 3-12.
Several assumptions have been established to support the selected pre-evacuation time.


Upon ignition, the hangar occupants are able to sense the fire cues, causing occupants to have
much shorter recognition and response times.



An emergency voice communication system is installed in this facility that can clearly define the
nature of the reported incident and provide instruction to building occupants who are not intimate
with the fire source.

Given the assumptions listed above, a pre-evacuation time of 10 seconds has been adopted. This premovement durations are based on SFPE HB Chapter 12-3 for buildings with occupants trained in fire
evacuation.

7.3.2.3

Evacuation Phase

From the initiation of the fire, a 10 second detection time before the fire is observed by the optical flame
detectors and 10 seconds of pre-movement upon alarm before occupant evacuation. Therefore from the
initiation of the fire, it is assumed 20 seconds will pass before occupant movement begins.
Additionally, it has been assumed that only the occupants in Hangar Bay 3 will be egressing through the
hangar bay’s exits. Occupants in the other hangar bays and support spaces will utilize their nearest exit.
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Hydraulic Movement Model

The evacuation time has been calculated with the methods introduced in SFPE HB Chapter 3-13. In this
model, all occupants will use all 12 exits equally, begin egress at the same time, and travel the maximum
allowable travel distance.
Results from this model indicate that the movement time for 96 occupants from Hangar Bay 3 is 71
seconds. For a complete analytical solution and determination of the movement time, refer to Appendix F.

7.3.2.3.2

Pathfinder Model

The evacuation phase was also determined using a human movement and evacuation modeling software.
Pathfinder software by Thunderhead Engineering was used to determine the movement time for 96
occupants located randomly throughout Hangar Bay 3. In this model, all 12 exits from the hangar bay
were utilized. The obstruction caused by the presence of the aircraft was included in the navigable travel
path. An image of the pathfinder model prior to movement initialization is shown in Figure 7-2.

Figure 7-2: Image of Hangar Bay 3 Pathfinder Evacuation Model

The results of the simulation show that the hangar bay is completely evacuated 35 seconds after
movement begins. This calculation serves as a useful validation when compared to the hydraulic
movement model time of 71 seconds. To determine the worst case RSET, the more restrictive value for
evacuation time has been used.
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RSET Conclusions

The various phases of the required safe egress time have been determined to accurately depict the
conditions associated with the design fire scenario. From this analysis, RSET was determined to be 91
seconds from fire ignition to the last occupant egressed from the hangar. A summary of the RSET is
included in Table 7-1. For a complete analytical solution and determination of the RSET, refer to
Appendix F.
Table 7-1: Required Safe Egress Time Phase Duration Summary
Phase in Evacuation

Time

Time from fire ignition to detection; that is, the detection phase, td
Time from detection to notification of occupants of a fire emergency; that is the
notification phase, tn
Time from notification (or cue reception) until evacuation commences; that is, the
pre-evacuation phase, tp-e
Time from the start of purposive evacuation movement until safety is reached; that
is, the evacuation phase, te
Required Safe Egress Time

7.3.3

9 Seconds
1 Seconds
10 Seconds
71 Seconds
91 Seconds

ASET versus RSET Conclusions

A review and comparison of the results of the individual ASET and RSET analysis indicate that the
required safe egress time is less than the available safe egress time by a factor of 2.46. Where the time for
the smoke layer in hangar 3 to descend to a height of 6 ft above the finished floor is 224 seconds, the time
for complete evacuation of the hangar is 91 seconds. A summary of the results of this analysis are
included in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2: ASET versus RSET Results Summary
Required Safe Egress Time

Available Safe Egress Time

% Difference

91 Seconds

224 Seconds

84.4%

Other findings from the RSET analysis indicate that at 91 seconds after fire ignition, the smoke layer had
only descended to a height of 27.1 ft. From these results, it has been concluded that the RSET includes an
appropriate margin of safety from the ASET and therefore, the life safety criteria defined in Section
7.1.4.1 has been successfully met.
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Aircraft Protection Fire Simulation Model

The Design Fire Scenario defined in Section 7.2 will also be evaluated to determine the incidental fire
effects on the aircraft.

7.4.1

Background

To model the fire scenario, Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) was utilized. FDS is an open-source software
produced by the National Institute for Standards and Testing (NIST). FDS is widely used among the fire
engineering community and boasts many strengths over other Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD)
software, including its focus on key physical mechanisms and solvers important for fire modeling. FDS
also boasts advantages as a powerful visualization tool.
FDS is designed to predict fire-driven fluid flow including, but not limited to, smoke and airflow
movement caused by fire, wind, and ventilation systems. FDS has been widely used and verified to
produce accurate results that greatly correlates to real life scenarios. The software functions by
numerically solving forms of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-driven
flow, with emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires. It also has integrated sub models that
calculate many fire-related phenomena such as radiative and convective heat transfer, sprinkler activation
and sprinkler sprays, and mixture-fraction combustion model.

7.4.2

Hangar Geometry

The hangar geometry modeled for this analysis reflects the layout of Hangar Bay 3. The dimensions of the
model are true to the actual hangar design with the exception of minor adjustments made to increase FDS
efficiency. The hangar bay has been modeled independently without the support area or additional hangar
bays attached.
The sloped roof was modeled as shown in white in Figure 7-3 using a “&MULT” command to replicate
the actual design. The draft curtains at the ceiling were also modeled as shown in purple and will serve to
contain the hot gas layer as required per the prescriptive codes.
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Figure 7-3: Preliminary Hangar Bay and Aircraft Geometry

7.4.3

Fuel Spill Analysis

During the 2014 fiscal year, [SOURCE REDACTED] indicates at least [QUANTITY REDACTED]
separate incidents in which an aircraft fuel tank was discovered to have leaked fuel. The jet fuel expelled
during these incidents totals roughly 2,110 gallons with the smallest spill being 7 gallons and the largest
being 1,000 gallons. This data will serve as the foundation for modeling probable fire scenarios.
This fuel spill data was further analyzed to determine a pattern. The spills ranged between 0 and 120
gallons with the exception of one very large fuel spill. This large spill, measured at 1000 gallons, was not
consistent with the rest of the fuel spill data. For the purposes of determining the design fire this large
spill was considered an anomaly and discarded. This left a range of spills which fit a consistent pattern
that could be used to generate a design fire.
To develop a fire scenario, the remaining fuel spill data was evaluated. The fuel size selected needed to
portray an accurate representation of all potential fires that may develop. Selecting a quantity at the top of
the range may exclude any differentiations created by smaller spills. Conversely, selecting a spill size that
is too small would not accurately portray a fire generated by a larger spill. The median of the fuel range
was taken to determine the most adequate representation of the data. After analyzing the data, a 60 gallon
fuel spill was determined to be the quantity to best represent the respective fuel range.
Because detailed information about the KC-46 fuel systems are unavailable, this 60 gallon quantity of fuel
has been used to develop the design fire.
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Fuel Characteristics

JP-8 has been identified as the aviation fuel used by the USAF and will be used as the fuel source for the
fire modeled in this analysis. In order for FDS to accurately predict the reactions within the model,
several properties of the fuel must be specified.
In Table 7-3, the primary properties of JP-8 used for this analysis are identified. Research showed that for
some properties of JP-8, a range of possibilities existed. For example, the density of JP-8 can often range
from 775 to 840 kg/m3 [1].
In order to maintain consistency throughout the analysis, a single value for each property was selected
and maintained throughout the scenario. This point was identified based on the conditions in which the
fuel would likely be found at the initiation of the model.
Table 7-3: Summary of JP-8 Fuel Characteristics [1]

Flash Point
Boiling Point
Density
Viscosity
Specific Heat
Thermal Conductivity
Heat of Vaporization
Heat of Combustion
Auto Ignition Temperature
Mass Loss Rate
Extinction-absorption Coefficient

7.4.4.1

38° C
300° C
805 kg/m3
1.60 mm2/sec
1.97 kJ/kg∙K
0.12 W/m∙K
360 kJ/kg
43,240 kJ/kg
238° C
0.051 kg/m2∙s
3.6 1/m

Fuel Spill Geometry

The fuel spill flows out of the left wing tank drain valve and on to the hangar floor. The geometry of the
fuel spill is largely dependent on the volume of fuel spilled and the physical properties of the fuel.
Utilizing data from a published Pacific Northwest National Laboratories report on spill geometries on flat
inclined surfaces [3], the depth of a liquid spill on a flat surface was determined. The depth was then used
to generate a surface area based on the overall volume of fuel spilled. Based the information provided in
the PNNL document, it was assumed that the fuel spill will spread out radially upon hitting the ground,
and therefore, a square fuel spill has been defined in the FDS model. The pool spill characteristics are
listed in the table below:
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Table 7-4: Fuel Spill Geometry Summary
Volume of Fuel Spilled (ft3)

Fuel Depth (ft)

Surface Area (ft2)

8.0

0.011155 [3]

719

The location and size of the fuel spill relative to the aircraft is shown in Figure 7-4.

Figure 7-4: Defined Location and Size of Fuel Spill

7.4.5

Aircraft Characteristics

The hangar is occupied by a KC-46 aircraft during the fire scenario. To evaluate the effects of the fire on
the aircraft, the KC-46 has been programmed into FDS.
For FDS to correctly calculate the effect of the fire on an aircraft, the emissivity, conductivity, density,
and specific heat of the aircraft has been specified on the “&MATL” line.
&MATL ID = 'ALUM'
EMISSIVITY = 0.9
CONDUCTIVITY = 167
DENSITY = 2700
SPECIFIC_HEAT = .900/

It is important to note that the properties above, with the exception of the emissivity, are for generic
aluminum and do not reflect any changes that may occur do to the addition of filler metals, advanced
coatings, or paints applied to the surface. The emissivity is based on the average emissivity found among
a sample of aircraft grade paints.
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Validation

In order to ensure the model is accurately reflecting a real world scenario, several validation checks were
made. These checks ensure that the simulation is operating as expected and accurately portraying the fire
scenario.
Due to limitations of FDS, some important components of the simulation cannot be validated. In
response, these parameters were programmed into FDS to ensure an accurate representation of the fire
scenario.

7.4.6.1

Heat Release Rate

FDS possesses several means and methods available to calculate the Heat Release Rate (HRR) of a fire. A
large amount of research has been conducted to validate its accuracy. However, these relationships begin
to break down when used to model large scale pool fires. Because of this, the HRR of each fire scenario is
calculated based on known equations and specified in FDS to ensure accuracy.
To determine the HRR of the pool fire several parameters are needed. These include the asymptotical
mass loss rate, heat of combustion, extinction-absorption coefficient, estimated diameter, and the surface
area of the fuel.
First the effective diameter must be determined based on the fuel spill surface area. Because the
4𝐴
𝐷= √
𝜋
Second, the HRR for liquid pools can be determined using the following relation given in SFPE HB
Chapter 3-1.
"
𝑞̇ = ∆ℎ𝑐 𝑚̇∞
(1 − 𝑒 −𝑘𝛽𝐷 )𝐴

A summary of the heat release rate calculation results are shown in Table 7-5 below.
Table 7-5: Calculated Heat Release Rate
Volume of Fuel Spilled (ft3)

Surface Area (ft2)

Estimated Diameter (ft)

Peak HRR (MW)

8.0

719.0

30.3

147.3
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Burning Duration

Just as the HRR was programmed into FDS, the burning duration has also been predefined. This is not
due to FDS’ inabilities to calculate the burning duration, but rather due to the specification of the peak
HRR. Because the HRR is specified within the model, the duration at which the fire lasts must be
identified as well.
The duration of the fire has been calculated using well proven mathematical relations. This duration has
been programmed into FDS such that the fire develops and decays realistically. The burning duration was
calculated using the following relations:
Regression Rate of the Fuel:
𝓋=

𝑚"
𝜌

Burning Duration:
𝑡𝑏 =

4𝑉
𝜋𝐷 2 𝓋

The results from each calculation are displayed in Table 7-6.
Table 7-6: Calculated Burning Duration
Volume of Fuel Spilled (ft3)

Estimated Diameter (ft)

Burning Duration (s)

8.0

30.3

176

7.4.6.3

Flame Spread Rate

The temperature of the liquid relative to the liquids flashpoint is the single most important factor in
determining the flame spread rate over the surface of a liquid. Most ignitions of flammable liquids can be
characterized by one of two major flame spread mechanisms: liquid phase-controlled or gas phasecontrolled. Research and testing on small scale fires have shown that, during the gas phase-controlled
state, the flame spread rate can be expected to be between 130-220 cm/s while liquid phase-controlled
fires spread at roughly 1-12 cm/s [SFPE HB Chap 3-9].
Generally, liquid fuel fires begin in the liquid phase-controlled state and transfer to the gas phasecontrolled state. This transfer happens as the fuel in front of the advancing fire reaches a temperature
above its flashpoint. In some cases, the transfer to the gas phase-controlled state can happen almost
instantaneously relative the duration of the fire.
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For the purpose of this analysis, a flame spread rate of 1.35 m/s will be specified. This is chosen to create
a conservative model, allowing the aircraft to be subjected to the effects of the fire for a greater period of
time before the suppression system activates. Additionally, due to the relatively small size of the spill
versus the spread rate of the fire, the overall time to full involvement of the fire could be considered
negligible as the worst case scenario. Instead, a flame spread rate of 1.35 m/s has been assumed, which
reaches a fully involved state 10 seconds after ignition.

7.5

Fire Model Results

The result of the fire model provide several key takeaways. The model was run for a total of 54 seconds
due to logistical limitations. First, as expected, the heat release rate performed as specified as shown in
Table 7-4.

Figure 7-5: Heat Release Rate versus Time - FDS

Both heat flux gas and temperature devices were located on the undersides of the aircraft fuselage and
wing. The distribution of the sensors intended to show the fall off of the fire effects along the aircraft. The
location of the sensors has been indicated in the diagram included in
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Figure 7-6: Location of Heat Flux Gas and Temperature Sensor Devices

An array of sensors were placed throughout the model to measure the surface temperature of the aircraft.
These sensors, while heavily effected by turbulence within the model, indicate that the surface
temperature of the aircraft will raise dramatically as the fire develops. A summary of the temperature
measurements are included in Figure 7-7

Figure 7-7: Temperature Sensor Measurements Located Under the Wing
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The temperature on the underside of the wing decreases rapidly as turbulence within the model begins to
hinder the fire and as conduction begins to spread the heat across the surface of the plane. Once a semi
steady state is reached, the underside temperature of the wing measures between 100 °C and 125 °C
throughout the remainder of the model.
Temperatures were also measured along the fuselage as shown in Figure 7-8.

Figure 7-8: Temperature Sensor Measurements Located Along Fuselage

The fuselage of the aircraft is not immediately effected by the fire. However, throughout the duration of
the scenario, the fuselage slowly heats reaching a peak heat of 98°C before the fire begins to decay.
An array of sensors to record the radiative heat flux experienced by the aircraft were located in the same
locations as the temperature sensors. These sensors, affected by the turbulence of the fire, indicate that a
relatively high flux will be expected for a short period during the time the wing is engulfed by flames.
The radiative heat flux on the surface of the aircraft rises rapidly as the fire develops and engulfs the
wing. A large peak, shown in Figure 7-10, in radiative heat flux develops under the wing of the aircraft.
This occurs approximately 12 seconds after the initiation of the model measures over 400 kW/m2. This
rapid increase in flux deteriorates quickly trending to a steady state. This pattern indicates that the wing
will be subjected to a radiative heat flux averaging 40-50 kW/m2 throughout the course of the fire while
the fuselage of the aircraft will only experience a radiative heat flux of 4-5 kW/m2.
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The measured heat flux results located along the fuselage are included in Figure 7-9, while the heat flux
results for the underwing measurements are included in Figure 7-10.

Figure 7-9: Heat Flux Gas Sensor Measurements Located Along Fuselage

Figure 7-10:

FPE-596
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Aircraft Protection Model Conclusions

Given the performance criteria, the fire had a significant impact on the aircraft. Although sustained
radiant heat fluxes of 90 kW/m2 were not reached, as the fire developed under the wing, the radiant flux
and the surface temperatures on the underside of the wing elevated to a point in which total failure of the
wing could occur.
Both the wing and the body of the aircraft increase substantially. During the simulation, the surface
temperature of the wing reaches temperatures approaching 100°C with the average surface temperatures
of the fuselage not far behind.
When factoring in the effects of the suppression system on the fire, it is unclear if the suppression systems
would have an effective impact. From videos of final acceptance testing of the foam systems, foam
solution usually begins discharging from the foam generators between 20 and 30 seconds. When
incorporating the duration for activation along with the flow times for early suppression, foam does not
flow from the generators until approximately 40 seconds after ignition. This allows for approximately 30
seconds of unsuppressed fire exposure at 40-50 kW/m2 which could potentially cause yielding of the wing
to occur.
A final note: In this analysis some parameters were excluded. Particularly important is combustion of
materials stored within the wings of the aircraft. Most aircraft utilize the space within the wing to store
fuel in quantities greater than the quantity utilized in this scenario. If the fire causes the wing to fail or
breaches the fuel container, the intensity of the fire can be greatly amplified. Due to this, it is important to
protect the aircraft with a fast acting suppression system.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Prescriptive Design Analysis Conclusions and Recommendations

The 3-bay General Maintenance Hangar was evaluated and determined to comply with the prescriptive
requirements of the UFC 3-600-01, DRAFT UFC 4-211-01, and applicable NFPA codes and standards
A recommendation for the requirements of the new foam suppression system design requirements
included in the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01, the USAF should consider allowing low-expansion trench drain
foam nozzles instead of high expansion foam systems. These systems allow for a lesser pressure demand,
greater operational flexibility with facility mission (i.e. airframe type) and provide foam coverage around
the aircraft silhouette in a shorter time span.

8.2

Performance Based Design Analysis Conclusions and Recommendations

In summary, the design of the 3-bay general maintenance hangar was evaluated for two major
performance objectives, Life safety and aircraft protection. Both performance objectives were analyzed
against a pre-specified underwing fuel fire.
The life safety analysis resulted in an available safe egress time of 224 seconds and a required safe egress
time of 91 Seconds. Because the ASET is significantly greater than the RSET, the performance criteria
has been considered as satisfied.
The aircraft protection analysis yielded temperatures and heat flux measurements that could cause failure
of the wing structure to occur prior to the release of the foam systems. This could potentially cause
detrimental results to the rest of the aircraft and facility if failure of the wing structure introduces
additional fuel to the fire.
To better understand the effects of the large scale hydrocarbon fuel fires and their effects on aircraft, it is
recommended that additional research be conducted on the subject. Ideally, a full scale test burn located
in a hangar outfitted with a system designed per UFC 4-211-01 would provide a wealth of information on
the effectiveness of these system. Additionally, this analysis would provide perspective on components of
the system that could be revised or improved to increase the reliability of the system.
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Subject Hydraulic Analysis Demand Draft UFC 4-211-01
Date
Calc by Z. Ataiyan

Known and Assumptions
● Each hangar bay is protected with a wet-pipe overhead sprinkler system and a high expansion foam system in accordance with
ETL 02-15.
● Design density of the sprinkler system is 0.2 gpm over the most demanding 5,000 sq.ft.
● The water supply is from dedicated tanks and pumps located in this building.
● Calculations show the minimum required preformance objectives of ETL 02-15 as modifed by direct request of AFCEC for
several items from the 95% draft UFC 4-211-01.
● Hose stream demand is provided by base domestic system and is not from the tanks and pumps.
● Calculation assumes a single KC-46 plane.
● Calculation covers both supply and demand requirements give PRV's on all riser with pump pressures over 175 psi.
● 8 Ansul Jet-X 27 foam generators were used in calculations.
Estimated Supply Water Requirements
System Protection

System Protection Area Limitations
(sq ft)
52,000
52,000
52,000

Light Hazard
Ordinary Hazard Group I
Ordinary Hazard Group II
Occupancy Classification

Light Hazard (HC-1)
Ordinary Hazard (HC-2)
Hangar Wet System

Design
Density
(gpm/sq ft)
0.10
0.20
0.20

Design
Area
(sq ft)
1,500
3,000
5,000

Code Reference

NFPA 13 2010, para 8.2.1
NFPA 13 2010, para 8.2.1
NFPA 13 2010, para 8.2.1
Hose Stream
Code Reference
Allowance
(gpm)
UFC 3-600-01, Table 4-1
250
UFC 3-600-01, Table 4-1
500
ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.1.1.2
500

Wet-Pipe System Hydraulic Estimation
Design Density
Design Area
Flow Required
Increase Due to Flow Balancing
External Hose Stream Requirement (hydrant off separate water system)
Water Demand
Area of Coverage (per UFC 3-600-01 para 4-2.3.6)
Design Density
Minimum Head Flow
Minimum Head K-factor
Sprinkler Head Pressure Requirement (7.0 psi Minimum)

0.20
5,000
1,000
300
0
1,300
130
0.20
26
5.6
22

gpm / sf
sq ft
gpm
gpm
gpm
gpm
sq ft
gpm / sq ft
gpm
psi

Subject Hydraulic Analysis Demand Draft UFC 4-211-01
Date
Calc by Z. Ataiyan

From Remote Area to Bottom of Hangar Wet-Pipe Riser
Flow Requirement for Remote Area

1,300 gpm

Sprinkler Head Elevation
Bottom of Wet-pipe Riser Elevation
Height Difference
Pressure Requirement

98
2
97
42

Losses for Branchline (Estimated)

15 psi

Linear Feet of pipe from Sprinkler Head to Base of Riser
Estimated Fitting Equivalent Length (100%)
Total Equivalent Piping from Sprinkler Head to Bottom of Riser
8" Inside Pipe Diameter
C-factor for Schedule 40 Black Wet Pipe
Pressure Loss Per Foot (Hazen-Williams)
Pressure Loss of Pipe from Sprinkler Head to Bottom of Riser
Velocity in Pipe
Pressure loss through 6" Riser Check Valve

450
450
900
8
120
0
14
8

ft aff
ft aff
ft
psi

ft
ft
ft
in
psi / ft
psi
fps

2 psi

Remote Area Summary for Wet-Pipe System
Flow Requirement for Design Area
Pressure Requirement at Bottom of Riser
External Hose Stream Requirement

1,300 gpm
93 psi
0 gpm

Hi-Ex Foam Hydraulic Estimation
Minimum Generator Flow
Minimum Generator Pressure
Generator K Factor

181 gpm
40 psi
28.6

G1 + branch
G2 + branch
G3 + branch
G4 + branch
G5 + branch
G6 + branch
G7 + branch
G8 + branch

2.469
2.469
2.469
2.469
2.469
2.469
2.469
2.469

190
206
206
208
183
181
196
203

190
206
206
208
183
181
196
203

120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120

0.130
0.151
0.151
0.153
0.121
0.119
0.137
0.147

T5 to T6
T6 to T7
T7 to T8
T8 to T9

2.469
3.068
4.026
6.065

183
181
196
203

183
364
560
763

120
120
120
120

0.121
0.150
0.089
0.021 E

T1 to T2
T2 to T3
T3 to T4
T4 to T9
T9 to RED
RED to BOR

3.068
4.026
4.026
6.065
6.065
7.981

190
206
206
208
763
0

190
396
602
810
1573
1573

120
120
120
120
120
120

0.045
0.047
0.101
0.024 T
0.081
0.021

Inductor

8"

Deluge Valve/PRV
BOR to PUMP
Strainer
PUMP to TANK

2873

120 0.009

6.0
0.0
-10.0
0.0
0.0
7.0
0.0
-2.0

54.8
57.3
59.1
58.4
45.2
50.3
51.8
55.0

12.7
13.8
13.8
13.9
12.3
12.1
13.1
13.6

15

43
7
45
67

5.2
1.0
4.0
1.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
10.0

50.4
51.5
55.5
61.5

12.3
15.8
14.1
8.5

53
35
1
76
125
55

2.4
1.6
0.1
2.5
15.2
1.8

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
45.0
7.0

57.2
58.8
58.9
61.4
96.1
100.9

8.2
10.0
15.2
9.0
17.5
10.1

0.0

155.3

10.0

0.0

165.3

4.2

3.0

170.8

2.0

0.0

172.8

0.3

0.0

173.0

30
63
28

153

12"
20.750

305
Chart

0

2873

0

2873

140 0.000

175

370
Chart

-202.0
-29.0
29.0 psi
16.7%

8.2

2.7

Start Pressure

Veloctiy Actual

8.2
5.3
11.4
5.4
4.2
7.2
4.8
5.9

Chart
1300

Total Pressure

33
5
46
5
5
31
5
10

6"
11.938

Elevation Rise

Friction Loss Over
Segment

Pipe Length

Assumed Fittings
Equivalent Length (50%)

30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30

35% per manufacture

PUMP
Pressure Required at Tank
Safety margin

3ET
3ET
3ET
3ET
3ET
3ET
3ET
3ET

Equivalent Length
Fittings

Fittings

Friction loss/foot

Pipe C - factor

Total Flow

Flow Added

Pipe Diameter

Subject Hydraulic Analysis Demand Draft UFC 4-211-01
Date
Calc by Z. Ataiyan

44.0
52.0
52.0
53.0
41.0
40.0
47.0
50.0

Subject Foam Calculation Demand Draft UFC 4-211-01
Date
Calc by Z. Ataiyan
Checked by
This sheet calculates the foam requirements per ETL 02-15.
Service Floor Area (A)
Depth (D)
Submergence Volume (V = A x D)
Submergence Time (T)

47,607 sq ft
3.2 ft

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.2.2

152,342 cu ft

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1

4 min

Breakdown from Sprinkler Discharge (S)

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1

10 cfm/gpm

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1

Wet Sprinkler Density
Design Area

0.20 gpm/sq ft
5,000 sq ft

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.1.1.2
Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.1.1.2

Estimated Flow Rate
Increase due to Balancing

1,000 gpm
1,300 gpm

Estimated Sprinkler Discharge (Q)

1,300 gpm

Rate of Foam Break Down (Rs = S x Q)

13,000 cfm

Compensation for Foam Shrinkage (Cn)
Compensation for Leakage (Cl)
Minimum rate of Discharge:

1.15

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1

3.0

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1

R = ((V/T) + Rs) x Cn x Cl

Minimum Rate of Discharge (R)

176,245 cfm

Minimum Rate of Discharge (R)
Service Floor Area (A)

176,245 cfm
47,607 sq ft

Rate of Discharge (minimum 2.6 cfm/sq ft)

3.70 cfm/sq ft

Quantity of Hi-Ex Foam Generators
Minimum Rate of Discharge (R)
Number of Foam Generators
Minimum Average Discharge Rate
Foam Generator Manufacturer
Model Selected
Output Gen 1
Output Gen 2
Output Gen 3
Output Gen 4
Output Gen 5

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1

176,245 cfm
8
22,031 cfm
Ansul
JET-X-27
21,763
24,232
24,232
24,366
20,662

cfm
cfm
cfm
cfm
cfm

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3

Output Gen 6
Output Gen 7
Output Gen 8

20,295 cfm
22,864 cfm
23,965 cfm

Total

182,379

cfm

Size of Bladder Tank
Discharge Duration
Calculated Foam Solution Flow
Total Estimated Volume of Solution
Amount of 2.0% Concentrate

15
1,573
23,595
472

min
gpm
gal
gal

Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.4

Subject Foam Spread Calculations Draft UFC 4-211-01
Date
Calc by Z. Ataiyan

From the preliminary hydraulic calculations, the velocity along each pipe length to each generator is known.
These velocities, along with deluge valve releasing time, and falling foam time are used to estimate the foam
coverage across the hangar floor at the end of one minute. This methodology is known to be conservative as
the filling velocity of the empty pipe is faster than the stabilized water flow.
This sheet estimates the amount of coverage in one minute at each generator. This is done to
verify 90% coverage of the plane silhouette can be covered in less than one minute in accordance with
ETL 02-15 para A1.3.3.2.1. See accompanying plans showing compliance.

For Generator 1
Fire Alarm
Trip Deluge Valve
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED
Water Flow from RED to T9
Water Flow from T9 to T4
Water Flow from T4 to T3
Water Flow from T3 to T2
Water Flow from T2 to T1
Water Flow from T1 to G1
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor

Velocity

10.1
17.5
9.0
15.2
10.0
8.2
12.7

fps
fps
fps
fps
fps
fps
fps

Length

55
125
76
1
35
53
33
61

ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft

2.0
5.4
7.1
8.4
0.1
3.5
6.5
2.6
4.1

sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec

Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps
Diameter of Foam Coverage

For Generator 2
Fire Alarm
Trip Deluge Valve
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED
Water Flow from RED to T9
Water Flow from T9 to T4
Water Flow from T4 to T3
Water Flow from T3 to T2
Water Flow from T2 to G2
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor

20.3 sec
20.3 ft
40.5 ft

Velocity

10.1
17.5
9.0
15.2
10.0
13.8

fps
fps
fps
fps
fps
fps

Length

55
125
76
1
35
5
55

ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft

2.0
5.4
7.1
8.4
0.1
3.5
0.4
3.7

sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec

Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps
Diameter of Foam Coverage

For Generator 3
Fire Alarm
Trip Deluge Valve
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED
Water Flow from RED to T9

Total
0.0 sec
2.0 sec
7.4 sec
14.6 sec
23.0 sec
23.1 sec
26.6 sec
33.1 sec
35.7 sec
39.7 sec

Total
0.0 sec
2.0 sec
7.4 sec
14.6 sec
23.0 sec
23.1 sec
26.6 sec
27.0 sec
30.6 sec
29.4 sec
29.4 ft
58.7 ft

Velocity

10.1 fps
17.5 fps

Length

55 ft
125 ft

2.0 sec
5.4 sec
7.1 sec

Total
0.0 sec
2.0 sec
7.4 sec
14.6 sec

Subject Foam Spread Calculations Draft UFC 4-211-01
Date
Calc by Z. Ataiyan

Water Flow from T9 to T4
Water Flow from T4 to T3
Water Flow from T3 to G3
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor

9.0 fps
15.2 fps
13.8 fps

76
1
46
45

ft
ft
ft
ft

8.4
0.1
3.3
3.0

sec
sec
sec
sec

Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps
Diameter of Foam Coverage

For Generator 4
Fire Alarm
Trip Deluge Valve
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED
Water Flow from RED to T9
Water Flow from T9 to T4
Water Flow from T4 to G4
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor

Velocity

10.1
17.5
9.0
13.9

fps
fps
fps
fps

Length

55
125
76
5
55

ft
ft
ft
ft
ft

2.0
5.4
7.1
8.4
0.4
3.7

sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec

Total
0.0 sec
2.0 sec
7.4 sec
14.6 sec
23.0 sec
23.4 sec
27.1 sec
32.9 sec
32.9 ft
65.9 ft

Velocity

10.1
17.5
8.5
14.1
15.8
12.3
12.3

fps
fps
fps
fps
fps
fps
fps

Length

55
125
67
45
7
43
5
63

ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft

2.0
5.4
7.1
7.9
3.2
0.4
3.5
0.4
4.2

sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec

Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps
Diameter of Foam Coverage

For Generator 6
Fire Alarm
Trip Deluge Valve
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED
Water Flow from RED to T9
Water Flow from T9 to T8
Water Flow from T8 to T7

sec
sec
sec
sec

30.6 sec
30.6 ft
61.1 ft

Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps
Diameter of Foam Coverage

For Generator 5
Fire Alarm
Trip Deluge Valve
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED
Water Flow from RED to T9
Water Flow from T9 to T8
Water Flow from T8 to T7
Water Flow from T7 to T6
Water Flow from T6 to T5
Water Flow from T5 to G5
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor

23.0
23.1
26.4
29.4

Total
0.0 sec
2.0 sec
7.4 sec
14.6 sec
22.5 sec
25.7 sec
26.1 sec
29.6 sec
30.0 sec
34.2 sec
25.8 sec
25.8 ft
51.6 ft

Velocity

10.1
17.5
8.5
14.1

fps
fps
fps
fps

sec

Length

55
125
67
45

ft
ft
ft
ft

2.0
5.4
7.1
7.9
3.2

sec
sec
sec
sec
sec

Total
0.0 sec
2.0 sec
7.4 sec
14.6 sec
22.5 sec
25.7 sec

Subject Foam Spread Calculations Draft UFC 4-211-01
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Water Flow from T7 to T6
Water Flow from T6 to G6
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor

15.8 fps
12.1 fps

7 ft
31 ft
70 ft

0.4 sec
2.6 sec
4.7 sec

Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps
Diameter of Foam Coverage

For Generator 7
Fire Alarm
Trip Deluge Valve
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED
Water Flow from RED to T9
Water Flow from T9 to T8
Water Flow from T8 to T7
Water Flow from T7 to G7
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor

26.7 sec
26.7 ft
53.3 ft

Velocity

10.1
17.5
8.5
14.1
13.1

fps
fps
fps
fps
fps

Length

55
125
67
45
5
63

ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft

2.0
5.4
7.1
7.9
3.2
0.4
4.2

sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec

Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps
Diameter of Foam Coverage

For Generator 8
Fire Alarm
Trip Deluge Valve
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED
Water Flow from RED to T9
Water Flow from T9 to T8
Water Flow from T8 to G8
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps
Diameter of Foam Coverage

26.1 sec
28.7 sec
33.3 sec

Total
0.0 sec
2.0 sec
7.4 sec
14.6 sec
22.5 sec
25.7 sec
26.0 sec
30.2 sec
29.8 sec
29.8 ft
59.5 ft

Velocity

10.1
17.5
8.5
13.6

fps
fps
fps
fps

Length

55
125
67
10
61

ft
ft
ft
ft
ft

2.0
5.4
7.1
7.9
0.7
4.1

sec
sec
sec
sec
sec
sec

Total
0.0 sec
2.0 sec
7.4 sec
14.6 sec
22.5 sec
23.2 sec
27.3 sec
32.7 sec
32.7 ft
65.5 ft

– FIRE SUPPRESSION DRAWINGS AND CALCULATIONS
This is not releasable in accordance with FOIA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption (b)(4) refers
to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DoD Component receives
from a person or organization outside the Government with the understanding that the
information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential basis in accordance with the
customary handling of such records.

– FIRE ALARM DRAWINGS AND CALCULATIONS
This is not releasable in accordance with FOIA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption (b)(4) refers
to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DoD Component receives
from a person or organization outside the Government with the understanding that the
information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential basis in accordance with the
customary handling of such records.

– ENGINEERING WEATHER DATA

– ASET VERSUS RSET CALCULATIONS

Available Safe Egress Time Calculation
Purpose:
The purpose of this calculation is to demonstrate occupants within Hangary Bay 3 can safely egress from the
building during a fire incident before untenable conditions are achieved, without the need for smoke/heat vents.
This calculation compares the smoke filling time due to a 60 gallon hydrocarbon fuel spill pool fire to the
estimated egress time from the facility. As shown below, the smoke layer descends to a height of 6 ft (1.83 m)
above the hangar floor 224 seconds after ignition.
References:
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2015 Edition.
•
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (SFPE HB)
•
Egress Analysis:
Known:
Single story aircraft hangar bay containing 47,709 SF of contigous open space.
•
The eave and peak heights of the ceiling exist at 50 ft and 98 ft above the hangar floor, respectively
•
Assumptions:
The fire will initiate under the left wing and will consist of a burning 60 gallon fuel spill.
•
The fire will be unhindered by the suppression system and will prodice an axisymmetric plume
•
The ceiling height used will be the mean ceiling height of the structure: 74 ft
•
Design Fire:
The design fire is located in hangar bay 3. For the configuration of this 60 gallon fuel spill, the calculated peak
heat release rate is 147.3 MW.
Calculated Peak HRR
Time to Peak HRR

147300 kW
10 s

Smoke Fill: SFPE Handbook (3rd Ed) Section 3 Chapter 9 Page 3-259

Smoke Filling:
Height of Hangar Bay Ceiling (H)
Hangar Bay Area (As)
Volumetric Entrainment Coefficient (Kv)
Fire Growth Coefficient (αn)
Coefficient for Fire Growth (T-Squared Fire) (n)
Smoke Layer Height for Tenability Limit (ZL)

74.0 ft
22.6 m
47,709 sq ft
4,432 m²
0.064 m4/3/kW 1/3-s
1,473.0 kW/s 2
2
1.83 m
6.0 ft

Time to Reach Tenability Limit (t)

224 sec
3.7 min

Required Safe Egress Time Calculation
Purpose:
The purpose of this calculation is to demonstrate occupants within the hangar bay can safely egress from the
building during a fire incident before untenable conditions are achieved, without the need for smoke/heat
vents. This calculation compares the smoke filling time due to several stacks of burning pallets to the
estimated egress time from the facility. As shown below, the allotted egress time of 1.5 minutes is well within
the 3.7 minutes needed for the smoke layer to approach the tenebility limit of 6 ft as addressed in the ASET
Calculation.
References:
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2015 Edition.
•
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (SFPE HB)
•
Egress Analysis:
Known:
Single story aircraft hangar bay containing 47,709 SF of contigous open space.
•
There are nine exits out of the hangar bay.
•
Although the actual maximum travel distance from Hangar Bay 3 is less than the maximum allowable
•
travel distance per the NFPA 101 Sec 7.6, the maximum allowable travel distance will be used for this
calculation.
The occupant density is based on the maximum expected occupant loading for each area in
•
acccordance with NFPA 101, Sec 5.4.5.4.
Assumptions:
From the initiation of the fire, it is assumed there will be 10 seconds before the fire is observed by the
•
optical flame detectors and 10 seconds of premovement upon alarm before occupant evacuation.
Therefore from the initiation of the fire, it is assumed 20 seconds will pass before occupant movement
begins. These premovement durations are based on SFPE HB 12-3 for buildings with occupants
trained in fire evacuation.
Only occupants in Hangar Bay 3 will be egressing through the Hangar Bay. Occupants in the other
•
hangar bays and support spaces will utilizes their nearest exit. All occupants will use all exits equally,
and occupants will begin egress at the same time.
Time to Egress Through the Exit
Total Square Footage in Hangar Bay
Occupant Load in the space
Number of Available Exits
Occupant Load per Exit
Maximum Specific Flow Through a Door (SFPE HB Table 3-13.5)

47,709
96
12
8
24

sq ft
people

Egress Door Clear Width
Flow Rate Through Each Exit
Time Required For People Cued at the Door to Pass through Exit

people
people/min/ft
of eff width
33.5 in
67 people/min
7 sec

Time to Reach the Exit:
Maximum Travel Distance
Maximum Exit Flow Speed (SFPE HB Table 3-13.4)
Travel Time to Reach the Exit

250 ft
235 ft/min
64 sec

Because the time to reach the exit is less then the time it takes for people to exit through the door, cueing will
occur at the door. Therefore the time it takes 8 people to exit through a single door becomes the most
restrictive egress component during the movement phase. The total expected egress time is calculated as
follows:

Required Safe Egress Time Calculation
Time Until the Fire is Observed
Premovement Delay
Movement/Cueing
Total time to Egress

10
10
71
91
1.5

sec
sec
sec
sec
min

Smoke Fill: SFPE Handbook (3rd Ed) Section 3 Chapter 9 Page 3-259
Assume:
The smoke filling is based on the methods used in the ASET calculations previously discussed in this
•
analysis. Refer to the Available Safe Egress Time Calculations for a full list of assumptions.
The tenability limit is based on 6 ft above the highest occupiable level on the hangar bay per NFPA
•
101 Section 5.2.
All smoke produced by the design fire is contained within the compartment, no leakage.
•
Smoke Filling:
The smoke layer interface is determined using equation 40 from the SFPE HB Section 3 Chapter 9 below.
This equation determines the smoke layer interface during the development of the t-squared fire. Per the
calculations above, the occupants in the building will have safety egressed 91 seconds (1.5 min) after fire
initiation. The equation below will determine the smoke layer interface at 91 seconds.

Height of Hangar Bay Ceiling (H)
Hangar Bay Area (As)
Volumetric Entrainment Coefficient (Kv)
Fire Growth Coefficient (αn)
Time when all Occupants Have Egressed from Hangar Bay 3 (t)
Coefficient for Fire Growth (T-Squared Fire) (n)
Smoke Layer Height at Completion of Egress

74 ft
22.6 m
47,709 sq ft
4,432 m²
0.064 m4/3/kW 1/3-s
1,410.0 kW/s2
91 sec
2
8.3 m
27.1 ft

Conclusion:
This calculation uses the formulas from SFPE HB which have been derived from testing of occupant
movement and smoke development. From the calculation above, it is expected occupants from the factory
floor will have completely evacuated the building 91 seconds after the initiation of the fire. Based on the heat
release rate of the design fire, it is expected the smoke layer will decend to a height of 27.1 ft above the
finished floor by the time the last person exits the hangar bay. This limitation is well above the tenable limit of
6 ft. Therefore due to the large smoke filling area, smoke/heat vents are not required to maintain tenable
egress conditions during a fire event.

– DESIGN FIRE CALCULATIONS

Peak Heat Release Rate and Burning Duration
This calculation determines the fuel spill surface area, peak heat release rate, and burning duration for a 60 gallon pool
fire in a large aircraft general maintenance hangar.
Knowns and Assumptions
•
JP-8 Fuel is spilled in the hangar bay as shown below.
•
The geometry of the fuel spill is not influenced by the incline of the hangar floor.
•
The fuel spill spreads in a radially uniform manner, forming an approximate square geometry
•
At the time of ignition, the fuel is stagnant.

Quantity of JP-8 Fuel
Quantity of Fuel Spilled
Volume of Fuel Spilled
Thickness of settled fuel spill [Spills on Flat Inclined Surfaces, PNNL]
Width of Fuel Spill Area (W)
Length of Fuel Spilled (L)
Surface Area of JP-8 Fuel Spill
JP-8 Fuel Parameters
Heat of Combustion
Auto-Ignition Temperature
Mass Loss Rate
Extinction-Absorbtion Coefficient
Fire Diameter
Fuel Density

60
8.02
0.011155
27
27

Gallons
ft3
ft
ft
ft

2
719 ft

43240
238
0.0510
3.60
9.22

kJ/kg
°C
kg/m2·s
1/m
m

805 kg/m

3

Peak Heat Release Rate and Burning Duration
Heat Release Rate of the Fire [SFPE Handbook (4th Ed.) Section 3, Chapter 1]

Peak Heat Release Rate

147.3 MW

Burning Duration
Vol
A
D

54 Seconds
0.2271251 m3
m2

Flame Height and Radiant Heat Flux Calculation
This calculation determines the flame height and incidental radiant heat fluxes for a 60 gallon pool fire in a large aircraft
general maintenance hangar. The radiant flux will be determined using several screening and detailed methods from
SFPE HB Chapter 3-10.
Knowns and Assumptions
•
JP-8 Fuel is spilled in the hangar bay as shown in the previous calculation.
A
D

Flame Height (Heskestad correlation)

0.235

/

#REF!

m2

1.02

Peak Heat Release Rate, Q
Fire Diameter, D

147313 kW
9.22 m

Flame Height, H

18.03 m

Fire Origin (Center Point)
X: 19.3
Y: 30.4
Z:
9.0
Location of Sensor
X: 29.8
Y: 34.0
Z:
3.6
Distance Between Points (in X,Y,Z Coordinates), L

12.3 m

Screening Methods - Shokri and Beyler
"

.

15.4
2
9.7 kW/m

Radiant Heat Flux,
Screening Methods - Point Source Model

q  

Total Radiative Energy output from the Fire, Qr
Angle Between Target and P, θ
Distance from the point source to the Target, R
Radiant Heat Flux,

Q r cos 
4R 2

26317 kW
26.1 degrees
12.3 m
2
7.8 kW/m

Flame Height and Radiant Heat Flux Calculation
Detailed Methods - Shokri and Beyler

F12 , H 

B  1 / S  tan 1 B  1S  1   A  1 / S  tan 1  A  1S  1
B  1S  1  A 2  1
 A  1S  1
 B2 1

F12 ,V 


 h
1
h
1

tan 1 
 S tan
2
S
 S 1 

S 2.67
A 4.386

h 3.91
B 1.522

F12 , max 

F122 , H  F122 ,V

S  1 
S  1 S
A

Ah
A2  1

tan 1

h2  S 2 1
2S



E  58 10 0.00 823D

B 



 A  1S  1
 A  1S  1
1 S2
2S

S 

2L
D

h

2H
D

q   EF12 , max

Horizontal Configuration Factor, F12,H

0.18

Vertical Configuration Factor, F12,V

0.36

Maximum Configuration Factor, F 12,max

0.40

Effective Emmisive Power, E
Radiant Heat Flux,
Summary
Device
Shokri & Beyler CorrelationPoint Source ModelShokri & Beyler Model
Fuselage Sensor 1
7.3
3.1
24.2
Fuselage Sensor 2
9.8
-7.8
19.6
Fuselage Sensor 3
11.2
12.9
17.9
Fuselage Sensor 4
10.2
-2.5
19.1
Fuselage Sensor 5
7.9
-3.7
23.0
Wing Sensor 1
10.2
-2.0
19.0
Wing Sensor 2
9.7
7.8
19.7

2
48.70 kW/m
2
19.7 kW/m

